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882 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 
is raised by tenants . Rather, its success or failure will be verified by the 
deterrent effect that it has on retaliatory conduct of landlords. The full impact 
of the law, therefore, will be known only by landlords. 
Douglas Lollie . , 
- '"f 
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND THE IA W: 
CONFLICT OR COMPATIBILITY? 
BENJAMIN R. CJVILETTJ• 
INTRODUCTION 
THESE are troubled times for international legal order . A band of terrorists has seized the American Embassy in Tehran and holds 
United States diplomats hostage.• The International Court of Justice2 
considered this internation I out a e and ruled unanimously that the 
hostages must be freed . 3 he court ec are t a ere 1s no more 
un amental prerequ1s1te for the conduct of relations between states 
than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies," a principle 
of international law so well established that "thoughout history nations 
of all creeds and cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for that 
purpose ."• Iran refused to comply with the court's order to release the 
hostages . With similar disdain for international law, Soviet armed 
forces have invaded a sovereign nation and installed a puppet govern-
ment. 5 Following a Soviet veto of a Security Council resolution,6 the 
United Nations General As~mbly overwhelmingly condemned the 
actions of the Soviet Union and declared that the invasion and 
occupation of Afghanistan is deplorable and inconsistent with the 
principles of the United Nations charter. 7 
Iran's continuing defiance of the very foundations of international 
law demonstrates the fragility of the law as a means of ordering human 
behavior. The action of the Soviet Union damages the rule of law even 
• Auorn<y G<n<ral or lh• Unit«! S1a1<1 Thi• Arttcl< •• adap1od from 1h< T<nlh Annual John 
F. Sonn•ll M•monal L<Cluro, dtliv<r<d by th• Auorn<y C.n<ral at lb• Fordham Untvtrlil 
loool or Law on anua IS 1980. Thi• Artie was prtpart wtl l • a.u1stane< o .. v<ral 
MIOrn<JIS in th< Otpartment ol u•Lict, particularly knn•th B R<U.nr<ld or th< Offico or 
letdUetn« Pohcy and R<vi<w. 
I. N.V. Ttm ... Nov . 5, 1979, I A, at I, col . •. id, Apr. S. 1980, f A, at I , col . J . 
e nternat1on1l Court o us 1 15 e pnnc1pa Ju 10 or~an of the nu 
Nations. " UN Chart<r arl 92, S9 Stal IOJI , IOSI (1945), T S So 993 , at 21. Th< ICJ 
coniist.s or IS m~mbus , urh from difftrtnl naoons, who Sf'rVt' for nm~ · ) Ur u: rm ~ Statute or lht 
lni.rnattonal Court ur Justt<< . Juno 26. 1945, arts J , IJ , 59 Stal 105S , 1055 -56 , T S No 993, a 
H ·26 Mtmber !> l~ to u ( the United :-\allons ma) unilaltralh ln\ OL.t tht ICJ's 1unsd1ct1on 1n 
MvcraJ s11u111on ~. rnclud1ng a d1sputt 1n\'Ol\·1n~ " any quu llon of in1trnat1on1I law (a.ndJ lht 
n1\ttnct nf 30\ <ac I ' 'hu h . 1f t .. ta hli~htct , v. oulct con\l1tu1t a hrrac h of .rn 10 l!'rna11on.-I 
obit •lion " / J •rt I !JI al 1060. T S N o 993 
Unllt'J ~ldlt"" l >1plomJ t1t and Con .. ular Staff rn T d irJn l"mh·d ~lall' " ' Jr.rn . I C J 
10rdor or "'" 1< . 1 •;~1 
a 
NV Tmtts, U.c 11, 1979, t A, al I , col 6 , rd . D<c JI , 1979, t A. at I, col • 
6. N.V. T1mu, Jan 8 , 1980, f A, at I , col 2. 
1. C A Ru ES-612 Uan 14, 19801 
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more significantly because its action cannot be rationalized as an 
aberrational act by revolutionary terrorists. Indeed, the Soviets claim 
shamelessly that their invasion was required by mutual def 
treaty with Afghanistan . 1 Both events illustrate tha ternational law . 
is not se -execu mg, an at our a il1ty to en orce the law through 
peaceful means is limited . When the law is broken with apparent l 
impunity, the ensuing frustration may result in a willingne5s to reject 
the very concept of law itself and a temptation to engage in acts we 
would otherwise condemn. There are indications that such feelings are .. 
astir within our nation today. Nevertheless, we must not permit our 
frustration to result in the abandonment of recently developed legal 
strictures on the intelligence-gathering activities of the U niled tates. 
This Article focuses on the evolving relationship between the rule of 
law and the intelligence-gathering activities of our government. The 
collection and utilization of intelligence information are e sential in-
gredients of foreign policy and national security, and the dramatic ' 
increase in international tensions emphasizes our country's crucial need 
for timely and accurate foreign intelligence. Nevertheless, pa~t excesses 
in the conduct of intelligence activities indicate that such operations 
cannot be implemented without careful regard for the rule of law.' 
The following analysis considers the complexities of developing a rule 
of law that comports with the genuine need of our government to 
engage in foreign intelligence activities and preserves the civil liberties 
and privacy interests of our citizens .~
I. THE NATURE AND ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE 
In the past, the line between foreign and domestic intelligence 
often was not clearly drawn 1 The Executive Branch, 
. . ' . 31, ' ' ' 
9. A number of concreuional commilltt1 and executive commissions have thoroughl> inw. 
tigattd instancH of misconduct by l.M intelligtnct agtncit• E .1., S l!Aop No 751 . 941h Cone., 
2d S..s. (1976) (htreinafter cited u tht Church Committtt l!Aoport); U•il<d StattJ lottllir•ocl 
..tc<N<iu .,.d Activiliu: P<>fvnM•« of Iii• 1.uu;,.,, .. CoMMu•lly: Hean•r• B•fori tli< """ 
Sekel COMM . o• /•leUii••«, 9-4th Cong. , ht Sess. (1974); D0Mt1lic l•Ull11<•U Optrat10•1f#F 
INltTftOI Steurily Pwrt0Jt1: Heari•is Befort llit Hou St Co111111 o• l•l...,.al Srrwnh . 9J rd Cona, 
2d Sess (1974), Staff of Subcomm on Constitut1onal Rights of·the Senai. Cumm on th< 
Judiciary , 92nd Cong, 2d Sess , Report on Arm) Survtillancr of Civ1hans A D•Mumrn"I")" 
Analysis (1972), Comm1ss1on on CIA Acuv1uu Wathm the United States, Reporl 1t1 1h, l'r.·, 1drnt 
(June, 1975), (htrttnafter cittd as tht Rocktftlltr CommisS1on Report) . 
1 10 A number or authors have grappltd with tht t\'Ol\'mg rule or , .... 10 thr ,Ht :1 o f !1;1 IH, n• 
Soe'<Unt)' E .i , Tht'Ohar1s & Meyer, Tht " f\'atto"ol 5,, wnty" )usttfual•O" for f ,/, t''"''' 1'1111• 
dropfJ•"I A" Elwsivt Exrtptrott , 14 Y...01}ne L Rtv 749 (1968). Ot"lltlopmr11tc "' 111• /..1.. TJir 
.\"allo"al Stcurlly /nttrtH a"d Cw•/ Ltbtrlits, 85 Harv L Rev 1 IJOt1972), t"unuut·ot /'nton 
o"d Po/1t1cal Frttdo11t · Appluobi/ity of 1ht FDMrth AMt"d11tt11t to "Nal•ottal S n uttf\ ' /lforJt 11•· 
llo•s, 17 U.C.L A L Rtv 1205 (1970), Nott , Fort11• Stevrily Swrvt1lla•" a•d /h f Foorlli 
..t111e•d111eNJ, 87 Harv. L. Rtv. 976 (1974) 
11. Tht difficulty of dlstinguishinr bttw•tn domutic and foreign onttlhJ•·nct·~aihtrittc 
operations has partially rtsUlted from an inability to ddn• clearly tht term' Jpplteablt le 
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however, is now careful to distinguish these two concerns . Thus, 
intelligence is defined to include only foreign intelligence and coun-
terintelligence, 12 both of which, in turn, are defined as information 
relating to "foreign powers, organizations or persons. "ll Recent bu-
reaucratic reorganizations and the promulgation of rules, regulations, 
and guidelines have also reflected this sharp domestic/foreign distinc-
tion.•• In the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, 
yanous types o surveillances The confusion has generally bten clar1titd u ra" aw an su. ult 
Urt increasm1dY abandoned or defined the ter·m national wcurll} For namplt , 1n Katz v 
Unittd Sta~s. J89 US Hl (1967). tht Court rtstrvtd dt<iston on tht queslton of th• 
apphcabihty of tht fourth amendment warrant rtqu1rtmtnt 10 national KCurat y tlectronic 
survtinance . Id at 358 n ZJ 
Jn Unutd Slates v Unutd Statts DISI Court CK<llh l, 401 l'. S 291 C197ll. lh< Courl analvnd 
tht domnuc L\ptcts of national :stturuy b.t onct again rutrved "lht , .,sue ~ "''h1ch ma~ bt 
.itvolwd with respect to actav111cs of fore1"n powers or tht1r a~tnts " Id at l ll (footnott omntrd), 
"' Unittd Staiu v Sm11h , .121 F Supr 424 , 429 cc 0 Cal 19711 cappltcab1h11 or warrant 
ftQUirtment to/twt•I" national ~unt) sun·eillance not dec1dtd , although warrant mandatf'd for 
,.,,.tJllC ~uni )' surve1tl•ncts) A#ttllt ma) have added to lht <onfusaon surround1n1t lht mtanini 
ol nauonal secunty Tht optnt<>n emphas11ts that II 1s ortrn d1fficuh to d1stmgu1sh between 
domtslic and forti~n threats to the nation '• stcurity 407 U S al 309 n 8 The Court acknowl· 
cds<d that Title 111 of the Omntbu• Cnmt Control and Sar. Stretls Act of 1968, 18 U.S C fl 
JSI0-1520 (1976) , uses the term national secunty lo rdtr only 10 the act1v111u or fore1«n powus 
1'. f 25 I H3) Ntvtrthtless. th< Court conunutd to apply iht term nauonal secunty 10 both 
domestic and fomgn 1nttlhgenet operations 407 U S 11 J09 n 8 
IJi Zwtibon v Mitchtll , 516 F 2d 594 CDC. Cir 1975) (tn bane), <<Tl dt•ttd, HS US 944 
(1976)1 the coun extended Krilh and tht warrant rtqu1remen1 to a w1ret.ap of a domestic 
erpniu.don that is neither the agent or, nor acting in collaboration with , a foreign power, tven 1f 
lbe surveillance IS undertaken in the name of foreign intelligence gathrnng The coun , 10 a vtry 
lone footnote , attempted to distinguish between .. mternal secunty .. or "dome~tic secunt)' '' •nd 
"fotticn se<unly " Id . at 613 n 41 Tht court 's tfforts f&Jl<d , how<vtr , whtn it concluded 
•'National security' will generally be used interchanaeably wHh ' fore1~n stcunty,' euept where 
tllit conttxt makes it cltar that IC refers to both 'foreign s.ecuntv and 'mternal secunt) • " Id On 
mnand1 the d1str1ct coun utabhshtd 1ts own categoniat1on and d1st1ngu1shed "domutK Sttu · 
riey, ... domeslic n1t1~nal stC'llrity," and "foreign security" surveillances Zwr1bon v Mitchell, 444 
r. Supp. 1296, 1299 n.3 (0 D .C 1978), rn/ d i• ~Ori aod rt111a•d•d O• other rro .. ds , 606 F 2d 
1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979) Although thut clusi6catoons appear to corre)att roughly w11h the 
4illinctions prov1dtd in Enc . Order No 12036, 3 C. F R 112 (1979), the terminology ustd may 
fMter contmued confusion 
1te. r tr o 6, I 4·206, 3 CF R 1 IZ , Ill (1979> 
1J Id H 4· 102 , · 205 . J CF R 112, IJJ (1979) Ctmpham addtdl iForttgn mttlh~tnce u 
drfined as " information relalin-. to the <•pab1htiu. 1ntenl1ons and • cll v111e., of fore1~n l>O" eu, 
orp.n1zations or ptr50n~. '' id I 4·-105 , J C . F R at IJJ, anrl counl<'rmltlh"enr t n dtfintd u 
•mform111on gathered and Ull\ 1t1u conduc1ed to protttt a~ain -. 1 u p1onakt anrl othtr clandtSline 
~lh~tnce ICll\' lllU, sabotaite . international terronst act1\0 1l1tc, or a.ss.a'"na11ons conducttd for or 
Ofl bthalr or forc1 in powrr c. . tl fklnlUU n n' or ptr>On .. .. 11/ ~ .. !01. ' ( .. R at 1 \J lnt t lll"tnct 
or~an1z.auons ha,:e not alwa' ., had the benefit of such s('t('nfic rl t•fintt1on' ~ htrma n Ktnl. former 
thauman of tht- CIA 's Board or Sauonal Ec.11matts, dtscribtd 101rlhJtnce in his p1\ota.J boot.. a.s 
compnsing thrtt dtfin1uonal subjects: knowledge lhat our nation must have re~ardmg other 
llt.lonl to &.1Sure it.self thal plann1n~ and dtc111onmakJng will not be conductf'd m 1~noranct , an 
trpniiation slructurtd to obtain, centrahie , •nd evaluate 1hat kno••lf'dgt , and the activity of 
lllhtring such knowltdge S Kent, Strategic lnttlligtnct For Amtrocan World Pobcy at 11 
0949 
14. Although many of the rtJulations and guldehnes are not available on pubh shtd form , they 
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criminal and intelligence investigations are handled by two separ le 
divisions. 15 Similarly, the President's Executive Order on Intellige a 
Activities specifically provides that it does not "apply to or interfnce 
with any authorized civil or criminal law enforcement re\ponsibility'~ 
any department or agency ."16 
, This distin
11
ction between foreig~ intelligence and ctomestic Jaw en. 
1orcement re eels not only the attitude of the courts 17 and the Jegisl . 
lure, 11 but also the present belief of the Executive Branch that ~ 
purposes of intelligence gathering are fundamentalh different fro e 
those of domestic law enforcement and, therefore, require differe: 
re~lation~. Law enforcement is intende~ to disco~er and punt h acts ·· 
which society deems unacceptable . Intelligence act1v111es are intended 
to acquire information so that the President and has adv1 ors can make 
inf~rmed decisions in cond~ctin inter ational diplomacy , foreign re. 
allons, an nation security furs 1 In counterintelligence, how. 
ever, there are some areas in which intelligence and dome lie Jaw. 
enforcement interests overlap. This intersection as particularly appar. 
can be obtained from tht ~ncy which thty (IOVtrn R<qutsls should ht madt 1n lht .._ 
manntr u r<qutsts undtr tht Frttdom o( Information Act 
IS . All forti&n inttlhetnet and counltnnttlha•nc• 1nvu111a11ons ar• handlrd b\ lh< JnJdll. 
Ctnet Division (0.viiion 5), and all domtsuc S«urity and inttrnational 1trronsm 1n•u11pU.. 
ace within the purvltw o( lhe Cnmlnal lnw.tiption Division (0.vuion 61 Su nott 14 ,.,,.., 
16 Enc Ordtr No 120J6, I 4-107, JC.FR 112, IJJ (1979) 
17 Stt not• II •wpm 
II Stt notu 49-59 ••fr• and accompanying lnl 
os1llvt: foreign nte 1Ktn e •"'n."°'·""••""'anc.;,,t.,;s:_'""•~r-=a~r,..,..,-v-:f-ro-m""".':1h~oc." 1n criminal invnd. 
ptions For uamplt, a foreign lnttlhetnct survullance may be und<rtak<n "llhout probalik 
cause lo belltw a crimt hu be•n commilt<d, and may be of considtrabl• durauon and ltopt. 
United Statts v Humphrty, 456 F Supp 51, 56 IE D Va l978) l u pu,,...,..,. to ptlwr 
lnformauon about lhe 1nttntions and capabihties of a foreign gov<rnm<nl not to oblaloo 
admlsslblt evidenct of a crimt. Id Bwl •« Un1t<d Staltl v Slont, JOS F Supp 75, 8l cD D.C. 
1969) (forticn lnltlli1<net wlrttap used u eVldtnet in criminal lnal), Unlltd Stalts v O'Ba .... 
.104 F Supp. 767, 768 (0 DC. 1969) (wmtap of •mbusy uJ<d as tVldtnet 1n mmlMI 
procffdin&). Fortign counterint•lli&<n<• activiliu mort cl<»tly paralltl law tnforetmtnt .. 
tivities Ntvtrthtltu, whilt it Is trut that many activil1t1 of tht tar~lS or counttrlni.lh,._. 
surwillanas may be criminal, Jtt, • c, 18 USC I 641 (1976) (rtlaun~ to unaulhomtd """ 
1owrnmtnt prop<rty), 1d ff 791-799 (rtlaung to esplon•); 1d ft 1151·1157 Crtla11oa It 
ubotqt), 1d ft lJll·lJ91 (rtla11ng to treason , stdition, and subwrmt aru.,11u), lht pnmary 
objeclJVt of tht surveillance is not prtparauon for prOHCuoon 8111 Jrt_ l"mt~ Su1r' ' 
Humphrey. •S6 F Supp a.t 56 (d1s11ngu1shm1 htt"''ttn fort1gn 1nttltu:rn<t' .. un·t1ll.an" and 
dornutk survullance and st.al Ins that 0 1l would Sttm ran that tht go,·trnmf'nl "ould rni1.1r fl 
domtsuc tltttronte sun~1llanet "llhout iOmt plan.\ to prMKutt "' 1m.,, ,,,.,, l /" nl1nn ' 
M11chtll , 516 F Id ~94. 648 ID C C1r 1975) (tn bane) (cla1m1na 11 "a "1m1h 1n ch••"'"'"' 
nauonaJ H<unt) survt1ll1ntt &.\ purrly non pros«utonaJ 1n the cr1m1nal !iil'11 .. 1· "'l.,, ,., "'"''"- o~ 
U S 944 (1976) Tht ObJKIJve o( a countenntell1Ktnct suntlllanct ~ 10 1dtnllh , •'oblr. ind 
prevent brtachei or xcunty 1n the foreign 1ntelh1ence and natM>nal ddt nsr ar,..ara1us TI1r 
distinction bttwun ctrtain intelhgence surwlllances and law enforcement ac11v111ts wu cartfutly 
xt forth In tht Stnatt Rtport accompan)'lnc lhe For~i&n lnltlha•net Su"T1llanct Acl S ltq. 
No. 604, 95111 Cons , 1st Stu. 4-7 (1977), rtri11ltd i• (1971) U.S. Code Con• & Ad N<"" JtOI, 
J905-09 
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nt when the government attempts to monitor clandestine information 
e athering by foreign agents in the United States because many forms of 
1oreign espionage conducted within our nation's borders are crimes 
under federal law . 20 The need to observe the activities of agents of 
{oreign powers and to defend against their operations demands consid· 
erable caution. 21 
Intelligence activities, which, as presently defined, pertain only to 
foreign affairs and national security issues, 22 must be kept strong and 
effective The government needs to obtain the best information avail-
able concerning the intentions and activities of foreign powers. The 
ability of the United States to react to events in foreign lands is limited 
under any circumstances. Without timely and accurate information, 
the ability to react constructively is eliminated Moreover, obtaining 
critical intelligence is exceedingly difficult. Although it may be vir· 
tually impossible, given today's technology, for any country to conceal 
substantial troop movements, the transfer of funds and arms and the 
strategies of foreign governments are not as readily detectable. Unless 
we possess current, accurate knowledge about the actions a foreign 
power is likely to take, our information base is limited; and the more 
limited our information base, the more speculative are our analyses, _>-
and the greater the danger to our security. Mcreq·, tle"'1 .. .,, is au · 
IO Stt nolt 19 ,.,,. Thtrt has betn oomt conctrn rtgard1ng lht ad<quacy or lhe tsp1ona~ 
.,.tutu 1n cuUJn carcumst.ancu Stt £1,aouie UtvJ •"d Lt•AJ Ht1m11is Btfttrt tJtt SMbcOMM 
,. L1tulollo11 o/tht Howu Ptr111••••I S<l<ct CoM111 011 l•ltf11ct1•« , 96lh Cong , Isl Stss 111!.!1. 
,, l'"''a m dt , TJu EJ,,o,.•it StotwttJ 011 t t Pwblfloho,. of Dtft11Jt 
/of-r-.i10• , 7J Colum L R•v 919 (197J), N1mm<r, Nalloq/ Stewnty Stenls" Frtt s,ttch 
Tl< /u•n Ufl U•du1dtd •• lht £1/Jbnc c.,,, 16 Stan L Rtv Jll (19741 
II Only a small ptrctnlagt o( all counltrinttlhgtnet CAJ<s ca.n be con1idertd for succtssful 
mmuW prMKutt0ns, and 1nvest1gahons o( foreign 1ntelh1tnce agtnts are w:kSom conducted Crom 
dw ouu.tl as they would be wut eventual pros.ttut1on expected Many countenntell1gence 
,,.,rtsoionals behtvt that cnm1nal proS«utions should ntvtr be brought against hosult agtnlS 
-.,. do1n1 so may only ~suit 1n their replacement by other, unknown a.cents o( whoK 
artmtks we may not be awatt Moreover, cnm1nal procttd1ng:s may not only confirm the 
KOU11Cy or CWJlfitd 1nrormallon thal hu been pused 10 a rore1gn pow<r, but may alt0 r<vtal at 
-. JOmt: o( the malenal to a far wtder audtenct This problem 11 known as .. 1rayma1I "Stt 
S....tr S.lttl Comm on lnttlhgtnct, 951h Cong , Id Stss , Rtport on National Stcunly S.crtlS 
llld Ill< Adm1n1>1ra11on or Ju>11Ct cComm Pnnl 19711 Crayma1I problrms, how<vtr , art not 
;.,.,moountablt For tumplt. 1n Un1ttd Sta1u v K1mp1lu, 609 F Id llJJ (71h C1r 19791, 1ht 
tnal rour1's proctdurn and JUdll:mt'nl a\·01dtd the gru mail problem The tnal court pre\.'enltd 
cla..q1fwod information frnm btintr 1n1roductd at tnal bv l\Su1n1t a prot«llw order afltr 1n camtn, 
n partc procud1n1s 1n which tM ,;ovunment preunttd e\ tdence o( tht KnJ1l1\."e document that 
•a.' J)3\~rl to lhr i;;ontl\ :.nrl or thf" FRl's counltrinttlhittnct ln\"t\tl(llhOn into ttM- rlncumtnl' 
dmppnrancr Id al 1141i' 1 tw courl o( ll>aMAI, upheld th«- t!iop1ona.1e con\'ICllon bL'<d upon thr 
ddrrwbnt'\ con ft .... 1on 1h.t1 h,. hact mtt "11h and c.olct a clJ\\ltkri •loc:umfnt to a <;o\'ld mttllllttncr 
offirn and u1~n suffiClt'OI othf'r '' ~t:nct to 'orrobor41tl' lht rthab1h1)· of the dtftndanl"s 
<onl<SS1on Id al llJI 
The Adm1nutrauon h~ 1n1rodu4.td lt11.slat1on 10 rnol\t the graymail problem and to establnh 
a workable and f11r proct'dure for handling clus1fifd 1nformahon 1 imanal Ca.RS t nolt 101 
ilfra 
Stt nolt IJ '"''" 
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essential element of effective intelligence gathering. Even if we 
able to gain information concerning a hostile foreign nation are 
success will be shortlived if we disclose the facts of our su~c:ur 
Further, if we reveal the information obtained, we will not only loss. 
our advantage and risk changes in the acquired plans, but we will al se 
jeopardize or perhaps destroy our sources and methods of gatheri so 
information . 2l ng 
at ma e these seemingly self-evident observations controversial 
is that intelligence activities can come perilously close to intruding upo 
our most basic statutory and constitutional rights. 2• This inheren~ 
danger is increased by the highly sophisticated technological advances 
commonly used throughout the world today, that widen the range of · 
possible intelligence-gathering activities . The necessity of secrecy ". 
however, often prohibits any judicial review of questionable intelli: 
gence activities. 2S The Executive Branch, therefore, is required to • 
redouble its efforts to ensure that intelligence activities are not exemp. 
ted from all responsible checks and balances. 26 The need to create 
23 Thtrt is continulns dtbatt concornins tho notd for and scopo o •11111nat• gov<rn-
1ttrtcy Co,..,.,. Sntpp v Unittd Statts, 100 S Ct 763, 765 n.3 (1980) (1l&t1ng iiJio 
leJovornmtnl has a compolhng int<rut 1n prottctine both lht 1ttrtey of 1nformaoon important le 
our national 1tturity and th• appoaranct of con6dtnttality IO usonual to lht tfftCUvo operatic. 
of our fortign inttlhgtnct strv1ct., alUl Colby, /ftltUi1<ru:t Stertcy ud Stcwnly '" • F.., 
Soet<ly, lnt1 Steurity 3 (Fall 1976) (Kiting forth a conctptual framework for lim1Ung unnocr-.,. 
govornmtnt di1elo1urts) with Church Committtt Rtport , supra note 9, (Bk n at 16 (rtc0«nwna 
tht dangers of uc...,vt stcrocy to a democracy> o"d M Halperin & D Hoffman, Top Sttrtt; 
National Steunty and lht Right to Know (1977) (arguing that tht Kcrtey vtil of thr ontrlltgenct 
community nttd1 to bt p1orctd) Stt 1un0Uy 1"utst11al10" of Pwblualto" of Stlw c.,.., .. 
lttltUi1<ru:t Rt#rl: HtanftfS Btfort lltt Howst Co111111 °" Slaftdords of O/fietal Coftdwtt. 94tll 
Cone., 2d Seu (1976) 
tt 1801-1811 (Wtst Su 
__!19~7~19~>,,JJo;;:iiimftll!"']tillic1c'iil'"irreovv1ifoi<1":"'111r"?:mlli1il'i1'ii'n L.0Tlii11~enii1c:Oo-a&.c:lt1i.v::i1uT.u;"""Su note 48 r 1tfro TM 
proposed National lntelligtn<t Act of 1980, S 2284, 96th Cone , ht Sess , 126 Cong Rrc SIJ07 
(daily td Feb. 8, 1980) [hereinaftrr c1ttd as S 22M), would upand the KOpt of iud1C1al rrvinr 
to covor physkal starches as well as eltctron1c survttllanct both within tht Un1ttd Statu ud 
abroad Id t 801 
6 aecutlvt rdu 120J6 and 1t.s 1mpltmtnlJng regulations create an dfec.t1vt slruc1urt fOf 
owrs1ght of 1nttlhgtnct actJvilJes '4'1th1n tht E:ucuuve Branch The duty to 1dtn11h , '"'PKt. 
and report unlawful or improper act1\'llY 15 placed upon senior officus throughout 1ht 1n1dllHn<t 
community E•te. Ordu No 12036, t t-7 , 3 CF R 112, t 19·20 (t9791 Th11 obit~"'"'" o 
mnforctd and mon1tortd by tho Inspectors Grneral and General Counsol for uch a~cn<' /4 I 
J -2. J C f' R at Ill ThtSt officus art requ1rtd to 1nvesuaatt and report to lht ln11·ll11t•nrr 
Oversight Board any act1vn1es tha1 raise que)llons of legal1t) or propr1tl\ Id 1 ht· ' \t 1 uUH 
order al.so ~ves tht ttornt)' Ctntr&I subs1ant1al O\tr511tht and rt\-H'\\ res >On 1h1l1tll-.. I d ' t. t 
J C F.R at 1uJfor txamp , the ..\ttornty tner 1s empowered to estabh .. h .arMI .11•11un r 
J-
procedures for tach agency which •·Ill en.surf comphanct with law and protecuon or cun,lllV· 
uonal nghts and pnvacy Id f 3-JOS , 3 C. F R at IJ I To adv1so and asstst the Attorn<) Gtnaal 
1n connecuon with htS intrll11<nct-rtlatrd rtsponS1b1hUts, tho Of6cr of lnttlhgrnct Polo<> ud 
-~-V1_._•w_w_as_e_s_ta_b_l_lsht_d_•_5--Ftd--R-" __ t_3_72_9_<_1_980)--(-to--be -cod-1fi_•_d __ ,·n __ 2a_c_. F_ R_t_o_JJ> nit 
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~; d rable mechanisms to regulate and review intelligence activities has 
~-- 1~ to the evolution of intelligence law. 
Il . THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE LAW 
.1 Although both law enforcement and intelligence activities have 
• · ted in this country since before the creation of the Republic, 27 they 
:e developed largely along separate tracks because of their 
nflt"cting natures. Law enforcement emphasizes openness, stability, 
cod a balancing of interests; its concerns are domestic and its scope is 
:mprehensive. Intelligence activities require secrecy, flexibility, and a 
single-mindedness of purpose; they focus on fo~eign develo_1>me~~ an? 
rapid adaptability to specific circumstanc~s . G~ven these. d_i~pan~1es, tt 
· no surprise that law enforcement and intelligence acllv1lles dtd not 
~nverge in the United States until. rece.ntly. . . . 
The first permanent peacetime mtelhgence organizations m the 
United States were created in the latter part of the nine~enth cen-
tury. 21 These were relatively ineffective, howe~er, ~nd during ~?~Id 
War I the nation relied to a great extent on the mtel11g~nce ~apa~thtles 
· fits allies. 29 It was not until World War II that Amencan mtelhgence 
~orts began to flourish under the Office of Strategic Services. 30 Apart 
from various directives dealing essentially with organizational matters, 
there was almost no accompanying development of law relating to 
intelligence activities. 31 
After World War II, a permanent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
was created by the National Security Act of 194 7. 32 This statute was 
the first public declaration by any nation con~erning the existenc.e a~d 
functions of its intelligence service . The Act 1s remarkably concise; m 
olk• is currrntly staffed by l<n attorneys and ls undtr th• d1recuon of tht Counstl for 
lattlha<n« Pohcy Thr Eucuuvr Branch oversight apparatus al10 1ncludu the PtrStdtnt'• 
lattWa<n« Ovenight Board (IOB), whkh ls compottd of thrtt 1nd1v1duals appo1ntrd by thr 
l'raldrnt E .. c Ordtr No 12036, t J-t, 3 C F.R at IJO Tht JOB ponod1cally revttw• tht 
.....,&ht proctdurts and guldebnts of each 1ntrlheence agoncy, forwards roports of tlltgahty to 
.. Attorney Central, and informs the Pt ... tdtnt of Its 6nd1np and any stnous quesuons of 
ltplity or propritty Id f J-102, 3 C.F R at IJ~31 Th11 comprrhen11v• S)'>ttm of overstght 
within the ExttutJvt Branch ts supplemented by extensive review 1n Con~rns Su note 104 
ill/r• 
The~ 1s clear ev1dtnet that General \\'ashm~on authorurd and rthtd u n substanual 
lftltlhgtnce act1Y1l1ts 1n the conduct or lht American Revolution For an txct:llenl •<count 0 t ' 
1story a evo u 1 n o nit tatu 1nte 1~tnct capa 1 1 10. '-t't A Dulltt. , Tht Crah of 
lntrlhgence ( 19631 Sn also H RanlOm, Crntral lntrlh~rn<r and National Secunt) (19511, 
Church Co mott~rt. sup•• not< Q, (BL \Ill at 9 I~ 
11 The first permanent 1nttlh~nct -.rnC\ was lht ()(fict of l ntrlliRen<e "'labh\htd by lht 
'\;a\'\ 1n 1182 Church Commltltt Rtport . 111,,-a nolt 9 (8k \ f ) dt \OQ Thrtt \tars la1tr lht 
Army organ11td its O'<' n 1n1tll1~tnct unit, the M1li~n ln1rlh~rnu· f>i, 1\1on Id 
29 A Dulles, supra notr 27 , at 4~ I 
JO H RanlOm, Thr lnttihgrn« Estabhshment 65-76 (19701 
JI A Dulles, sv,ra note 27 , at 42-« 
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five short subparagraphs it instructs the CIA to collect intellige . 
information and to perform other related functions at the directionnc~ 
the National Security Council. lJ The Act's sole express restriction~ 
the proviso that the CIA should not have any police, subpoena or 1 IS 
enforcement powers or internal security functions . 14 This Ji~itat~w 
was as much a concession to established law enforcement agencies ~0.~ 
was an effort to prevent the creation of an American secret police 1: 
With the exception of espionage statutes enacted originally in 1917 ~ 
and subseque~~Y amended, 16• and administrative housekeeping laws ~t 
enacted to fac1htate the operation of the CIA and the National Securit 
Agency, there were no other laws expressly rel tin to United Sta/ 
intelligence activities from 1947 until the 1970's 7 n act, uring t .: 
per1 aws ere passe a , 1 en 1 r y, would have obstructed 
or prevented clearly legitimate and necess intelli ence ro rams. ll .> 
ace w1 an a sence o particu arized law or precedent and an array 
of general purpose laws inappropriate to intelligence endeavors the ]: 
government and its intelligence agencies understandably ignored the 
broad range of legal strictures that apply in other areas of governmen- r 
ta! activity. The deference shown to intelligence matters for almost 
thirty years by the public, press, Judiciary, Congress, executive 
officials, various Presidents and Attorneys General considerably 
strengthened the assumption that intelligence efforts were so different 
or special that modified legal standards should be applied to them. n ' 
JJ. Id. f 40.l(d)(IHS). 
34 . Id. f 40.l(d)(J). 
JS Roclr.ddltt Commission Report , •wpo nole 9, al 61 22&4, sw,ro nole 25, proposcs 10 
ep ace un y prov111ons govermng ntellisencr: 1ctiv1tin As ~nator 
Huddleston noted when be introduced S 2284 "The Nalional Security Acl of 1941, th• cumn 
'charter' for lnteUl~nce activities, Is VA&Ue and cursory. As Clark Clifford, a pnmary author 0 
thal ~lion, told this commilltt, that act was considered interim l<chJalion lhat would 
replaced once lhe Executive and Concress belier kn<w what was ~uir<d [In S 22&4) wr ha 
civen the lnteUl~nce community authority lo do whal n«d• lo be done" ll6 Cone R.c SllOS 
(daily ed. Feb. a, 1980). 
o present structure and functioning of the 1nltlhgenct commun11~ I) that 
the Ol'lanluUons enc~ 1n fomgn int<lhgence, only the ClA hu been rru1td b1 
l<cislalion. The National Security Agency, lht FBI, and the Defense lntelhcence A~tnn ha1t 
been opuallnc without lq1sla11vr charters 
38 For example, there arc a vat1el)' o( st.atutcs which, 1f applied literally, would lin111 1ht 
ability ol lhc FBI to encace U\ undercover 1nvest1gat.tve opcrauons for the collttuon or fo rt11n 
intelligence or counlennltlligence E r , JI U S C l 484 (19761 lrutncung th• use of I"""~' 
from government opuauons), 1d I Sl I (rcstricunc 1he deros11 into banks of procf"td .. tron1 
~overnmcnt operations), td I 869 (rrstnrtlntt acqu1s1t1on or creation of propnet.a~ coqlfir,tlH•n" 
or busmcss entities) Jn rttcnt years, Concress has used 1he Departmeont of Justice Appropn•Oon 
Authonulion Act lo provide an annual wa.1vcr from these rrqua~mcnu for tntelhgenct optri1 
lions Su, 1.1 .. Oep'l of Justice , Appropriations Act, Fucal Yeas 1980, P.L 96-IJ2 , t 11•1. 9l 
Sw. 1040, 1045~, rcpi..Ud i11 (1979 U.S. ode Con & ew 
,. 
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the past few years, however, this perception has changed, and 
ove~ legal principles have been specificall>: developed to govern 
~Jigence activities. Although there may c.ontmue to be some c?nfu-
1. about how the law applies to a particular matter, there 1s no 
fo~er any doubt that intelligence activities are subject to definable 
legal standards. . . . 
The first comprehensive statem~nt . of mtelhgence . I~".' , wh1c~ de-
1
. ated various standards, authonzat1ons, and proh1b1uons designed 
me · · · d b P 'd 
govern our mtelhgence operations, was announce y res1 ent to 40 f f · · h F d on February 18, 1976. A ter two year~ o expenence wit 
~sident Ford's order, President Carter issued his own executive 
d r which broadens and strengthens the controls over the intelh-or e . d · h · ence community .'' For example, this or er requires t at vanous 
g ocedures be developed, subject to the approval of the Attorney 
beneral, to govern the complete range of collection an~ dissemination 
actices by all intelligence agencies when the information collected or 
~~minated pertains lo persons entitled to the protection of the 
United States Constitution .42 The United States is the only country 
that has issued such a comprehensive statement. 
President Carter also ordered that the government's document 
classification system be changed. 41 This new executive order officially 
embraces the principle that even a properly classified document should 
sometimes be declassified if the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
the damage to national security that might reasonably be expected 
from disclosure." The order also creates an administrative mecha-
nism complete with disciplinary sanctions, designed to eliminate any 
abu~s of the system,45 such as the unnecessary classification of 
documents. 46 
bavt full d1screoon to undutakt 1nttlh1tnct operations to protect nauonal S«unl) Unurd StalH 
• Un1kd St.a1u Dill Court (Kt1lh), 407 US. 197 , Jl6-17 1972 n aCl , uSl<t pa menl 
in ution of individuals involved in two large-scale m&JI opening programs operating _V 
btt•ttn 19Sl and 197J because of the amb1gully of the law as II related 10 1nttlhirnce operations ___.-
dunnc that penod I>ep't of Justice, Report Conce:rning Its lnvut1(lattons and ProM'Cutonal 
Dt<illOM With Respect to Central lnttlhgenct Agency Mail 01Mnlnfl Act1v1t1u in the Unlltd 
State:s (1977) Smet Kt1tlt , however , the courts have attempted to define the con~1tu11onal limits 
o( 1nttlh~nct mv lJ a tt. nott 11 IMP4 
40 1ec rdtr No 11905, J 90 (1917:_1,,_ __ .,.....,.....,..,=~'.":":"."".'"::°'.:':"."'.:::'f 
• I Enc Order No llOJ6.JC FR lll(19791 oruampt. rr<1 tnlC•nrnordtr~Ot 
," 1 ent ord s order m sp«1 ymg the prteond1t1ons for Llr~ttan,:: lnllf'd !:>lilt 
pe:noni for tltclron1c iut\ t1ltanct Co'"part 1d i 2·201, l C F R al 116 ;..11h E:.uc Ordu No 
llQO~ . t S(b)(ll. 3 Cf- R QO. 100Cl'H71 Pru1t1tnt Carttr'~ nrdtr al"'° ~mt1n ... (nr tht fir,111m,. 
1rlt\·1 ion and mo\ it iur\C•1llanct, Extc Order No I 10J6, § 1·10J. J l f- R "'' ~ u\ u1 
procurtmtnl and conlr•c.lmll Id J <:FR at 119 
• I Enc Order Ko llOJ6 , t 1-101 , J C .F R 111 , I 
• l Elec. Order No 11065, J CF R 190 (1979) 
« Id f J . JOJ, J CF R 190, 197 (19791 
4S Id. f S, J C.F R 190, 101-04 (1979) 
46 Id f 1-J lo -6, J C . FR 190, 19J-9S (1979) 
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Congress has also played an important role in the development of 
intelligence law . In 1978, Congress enacted the ForeiRn Intell i11:enc 
Surveillance Act (FISA),•7 which mandates judicial review of cerlaj~ 
proposals from intelligence agencies regarding the conduct of 
intelligence-related electronic surveillance in the United tates.•• 
Moreover, the Attorney General retains sole authority to approve 
agency-certified surveillance applications before they are submitted to 
the court.•9 This judicial and executive review process helps ensure 
that only necessary and carefully considered electronic surveillances 
will be 1mtllited 9 Governing standards for intelligence operations are 
also provided by the Case-Zablocki Act, which requires that Congress 
be advised of any international agreement to which the United Statts 
is a party, including agreements between intelligence services " Both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives have created independent 
committees with primary responsibility for overseeing the actidties of 
the intelligence agencies. 52 The Freedom of Information ActH and the 
Privacy Act5• have also had a significant effect on the information 
collection, dissemination, and storage practices of the intelligence 
a encies . f· 
or e pas ree years, Administration and Congressional rep. ~ 
---~resentatives have endeavored to develop comprehensive charter legis- J 
lation that would delineate proper and improper intelligence ac- ~ 
tivities . 55 This goal however, has proved far more elusive than many 
47 . Forrign lntelligtnce Surveillance Act of l 978, Pub L No. 9S-S 11 , 92 Stat 1783 (codtJi<d 
al SO USC A fl 1801 -18 11 (West Supp. 1979)). 
FISA irecu 
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had an 1C1pa . nee age 
societies with vastly different cultures, most of which we do not fully 
understand, and to provide services in an atmosphere of international 
palitical tension and volatility. The effort to reach agreement on a 
charter that gives the agencies sufficient flexibility to meet changing 
situations to protect our security, without delegating virtually unlim-
ited discretion, has been herculean . 
On February 8, 1980, Senators Huddleston , Mathia~. Bayh, and 
Goldwater introduced the very complex and comprehen ivc National 
Intelligence Act of 1980 CS. 2284).56 With few exception . S. 2284 
represents a consensus of the Executive Branch and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence concerning the principles RO\"Crnin~ United 
States intelligence activiticsY S. 2284 carefully balances the practical 
need for an intelligence apparatus with the guarantees provided by the 
Constitution and other relevant laws, and, for the first time, legisla-
tively defines and authorizes the activities and conduct of the entire 
intelligence community. S. 2284 also provides workable standards for 
the initiation of activities concerning United States persons,51 by 
providing a clear hierarchy of responsibility and oversight, and by 
prohibiting certain activities that are anathema to American democ-
racy. 5' Regardless of whether S . 2284 becomes law, however, its 
formulation and consideration by the Senate has had the positive effect 
of focusing attention on the policy choices required to be made in 
conducting our intelligence activities and on the structural tools avail-
able for implementing those choices. As long as we continue to 
examine objectively the legal guidelines for our intelligence operations, 
I am confident we will neither abandon our progress nor retreat from 
what we have gained . 
111. ILLUSTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTELLIGENCE 
GATHERING 
·;-i The basic tension in intelligence-gathering activities exists between 
Exµu1ence has demonstrated that our 1ntelhttence •1ttnc1ts are functioning "'II untitr 
The record rdutes the ar1tument that conartss1onal con~1deration of such 'llalutr• -.nuld 
un<fcrmn'lle the t>nllrt inl.fllur.encr apparatus of the United State" Su ''"'raUy S Krr 'o ' ;Q 
96th Con~ . 1979 -
<J t i; SC ~ I 11th! 11976 A: Supp II 1<nR1 
'! I h1,: "'it'03lr ~dl'<'I Commltll·C on ln1cll1lt"Oll' "a' <rl'all'<l b\ s Res 400. ~~Iii l n llt,! .'ft 
.......... . 111 Con)l RC'r 1~6i\ · 1' 11 1>76) Thr ll ou-.c P1•rm.rn<·nt Sclt"Cl Commllll"(' nn l 1111 lhi.:t1 1• f 
\\a' r .. t .. Uh hcd IJ\ H R Res 6S!l, 9~th Cona, hl :x,\ , 11J Cong Rec . H i IQ.a Ob 11l.11h rti 
July 14 . 1Q1;1 
sJ ~use~ ssz 119761 
H Id I SS21 · .• 
SS Ont o hurch Commlltf't wu to create a record to '<'n t u a 
the government's legitimate need for information and the individual's 
ri ht to privac Although federal law protects United States per-
l6 S 1184. supra note 15 
~; Pru1dtnt Carter ... 1attt1 thtrr \\a~ ··,1rtualh <ompl<'lt: a1r\·C'mt•n1 ll"·t\\nn th• l.,null\t' 
HruKh and tht Senate 5-rlt'Cl Comm1tttt on lnttlh~tnctJ on tht· t1qrnn11at1u11 uf tht· 1n1dh•t·nH 
fommunuy and on tht 1uthorua110nc. anc1 rtstncllon!i llCrtainm1 to mttll1~t·nu· rollt'<lion an1I 
'1•'1 1.tl 3(11\lllf\ .. 116 C-11111 Rn ~I \Qi (cl.uh t'd h·h a ll4XIJI '" '""llllU\d hu\\t\\'I lit 
\Ulr that "a ft¥. ISSUl'' rl'm:t1n 111 Ill" rt'\Ol\l'<I " Id On(' or thf' pnm,tn 1J1 .. .Jl.!'h1'mt•111-- ht•l\\ltn lhc· 
.t1l~t11n1'llrillllon anc1 thr duthor .. ol '-, 11iu rtlatt'~ lu 11r111r u1M1r11n~ 111 ( 11nt:h· .. .. ,,f 1•1\1·r1 
llf'rations and stnslll\f' ltllltcuon Opt'rauons Sa nott 10' flf/rn 
SI Stt nott 6 t ••fr• 
S9 for example, S 128-4, Jt1pra note 15, proh1b1ts a.ssassinallon. 1d ~ IJI. CO\trt domtsllc 
"°Pa«anda , id I Ill, CO\'trt contracting with tducat.ional inslllullons . 1d § IJ4 , and accom· 
'1uli1ng indirectly what cannot bt done directly, 1d f 135 
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~ons61 from excessiv~ or impro~er intr.usio~s into he~r .P~ivate affairs 7 
m the name of national secunty,62 mtelh ence act1v1lles aimed at ~ 
collecting information not publicly availab 6 evitably involve S0111t ~ 
inc~rsion into the privacy ?f in~ividuals ~r. o.rgan!zations. The rights J 
wh1ch may be affected by mtelhgence activ1lles directed against non- ~ 
consenting United States persons arise from the Constitution, particu-
S«ks comts from fortagn ptrsons and organu.ahons, most of lhtm located out.s1dt lht Urultd 
Statu In all casn, the redtral aovernmtnl coll«ls lht information this counlry nttds wilJiout 
1nttnt1onally violaung Uruttd Statts law Unued Statts law contains rew hm1tat10ns on lllt 
collection or 1ntelhg<nct from roreisn sources Stt, t I, SO USC.A t 1802(aXI MAXi> (Wtst 
Supp 1979) (tltctronk survtillance: d1rtcted at communicaltOnJ t1clu.s1vtly btt-.ttn °' •raonc 
fowgn powero may be apptoved by the Attorn<y Central without court order), Exec Ordtt No 
ll0J6, t 2-208, J C . FR. I 12 , Ill (1979) (rtslrKlJng only the colltcuon or nonpubhcly av.,lahlt 
1nformataon conctrning United Statts ptrsonJ) 
61 
2214, ,.,,r• note 25 , however, provtdu a more hm1ttd dtfinitioa 
United tales penon Id f IOJ<ll) Fe>< example, 11 ududt1 corporations Incorporated 1n lllt 
United Stales and unincorporated 1WOC11llon1 orsanued 1n the Uniltd States which are "opcoly 
acknowltd&ed by a foreicn sovemmenl «>< sovtrnments to be dirt<ted and controlled by -' 
foreicn government or sovemments "Id Ont'• status u a United States person is, In general, Dot 
dtltrm1ntd by on<'• location Thus, a Un1ttd Statu c11J1tn abroad remains a United Stata 
person for intelhgenct law purposn, whole a foreign visitor to this country dots not automa11cally 
become a Unhrd St.atrs person upon entry into this counlry There a.re a number or re~tnct1oru: ia 
the law whkh prolt<l fore1cn v111lon from unwarranltd 1ntelllgenct actlvltlts on this country, bul 
thost hm1tall0ns are 111nificantly d1rrerent from the ont1 applicable to United States persons f• " 
example, Elt<utivt Order llOJ6 prolt<ls Unittd States person• and foreicn visitors alokt r-
unrqulated covert e&tttronte or tnttha.rucaJ mon1tonn1. phys.Kai K&rches1 m&.11 su"'t1l11nce 
the Unittd States, and from unlawrul phy11cal surve1llanct by the FBI Exec Order No 120J6 
ff 2· 202 to · 206, J C. F R. at 126-27 The prote<uon1 provided for fortlcn vlsoton, how<>rr, 
rar mort limittd than tho1t mandated for United States persons Ste, t 1 , id f 2-208, J C.F 
at Ill 
1nfonnation 1s a threshold constderauon 10 the apphcauon or legaJ standards to 1nu•ll1,tn<t 
iathwng The procedurt1 for tht CIA an<! tht 0.parlmtnt or l>t(tn" dtfint tht h'rm pubhck 
ava1la1* sim~arly The Oden" 0.partmtnl'I dt6n1t10n provides "'Available pu~hclv' mtan• 
1nformatt0n that has betn pubh~htrl or hroadca.ct for if'ntral pubhc con.sumpllon '' I\ .ubhlr 
upon request to a rn<mbtr or lht general 1iubhc ' could lawrullv be lttn Of heard b\ •n\ , .. ,...i 
obstrvtr, or u madt ava1lablt at a mtelln(l optn to tht gtntral public "Str noh" I-' s1i1p,o S 
2214, 1wpro nolt IS, (a1l1 to dtfin< what information IS pubhrly available but I""' ido th< 
follow1n1 standard for the collttuon and u" or pubhd~ available information "Pubh< h a' •1bblt 
1nformauon conctrnong any United Statu penon may be collttltd by an entity or tht 1n1tll1~tnct 
ce><nmunity when such 1nformat>0n is relevant to a lawrul (unction or that entity, and may bt 
retained and dlsumonattd for lawrul govrrnmental purposes " Id f 211(<) 
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larly the first and fourth amendments. Because our government does 
not exist as an end unto itself, but as a means of preserving certain 
precious freedoms for each of us, we cannot allow a need to protect the 
nation to become an excuse to violate the very rights the government 
was instituted to protect. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the govern-
ment's legitimate need for intelligence information which may, at 
times affect the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution . 
A. First Amendment Issues 
United States persons may acquire their knowledge of foreign gov-
ernments in the course of political activities protected by the first 
amendment, and courts are often required to balance these first 
amendment rights with the government's need for intelligence infor-
mation . • 4 It is generally recognized that, in certain circumstances, the 
government can compel a person to disclose information about such 
protected activities. 65 The courts have adopted an exacting standard to 
analyze the encroachment that a compelled disclosure imposes on first 
amendment freedoms . The governmental interest in disclosure must be 
substantial . Also, courts have required that there be a "relevant 
correlation"66 or "substantial relation"67 between the governmental 
interest and the specific information to be revealed, and that the direct 
and indirect burdens on an individual's or group's associational rights 
be carefully scrutinized . 61 A final factor that weighs in the balance is 
64 The first amtodmtnt freedoms of u.soc1ataon and or t1prus1on art 1mphca1ed whenever 
the Sovtmmtnt Ce><npeJs an 1nd1viduaJ lo dthn<att his pohtocaJ affihallOM before a kp1Jallvt 
commitltt, • 1 , Eastland v Unottd Statts Strvictmtn'I Fund, 421 US 491 509 (197~ 
• 11 alive Investigation e><nm , J72 US SJ9, $44-46 (196JI, Swttiy v Ntw 
Hampshire, JH us 2J4, 249-SO (1957), or a srand )Ury, t'' Braniburg v Hayti, 40I us 
66S , 690-91 (19721, Bursey v Unottd States, 466 F 2d IOS9, 1015·16 (9th Cir 1972), I• rt Wood , 
4JO F. Supp 41, 45-46 (S 0 NY 1977), I• rt Vtrplank , J29 F Supp 4JJ, 4J7-JI (CO Cal 
1971), or to ldtnh(y his pohlKal behtb as a condition or t•ttc111ng lirot amendment nghts, • I , 
1.&mont v Postmuter Gen, Jll U.S JOI, JOS-07 (1965), NAACP v Alabama, JS7 U.S 449, 
462 (19511, or or obtain1n OVt ent tmploymtnl, l' ' Shelton v Tucker J64 us 479, 
417..U (19!!2!j tt ft•crolly L Tnbe, Amencan on•totutiona w f 12-2, at 581 -82 (19_!ll 
6S Lbtr are , howtver. st\tre hm1ts on the aovernment 's ri«ht to comPfl 1nrorm;tt0~or~ 
n.ampk, 1t is unconst1tutt0nal for a state to compel a pnv1tt pohucal orJanu.allon to urn1sh its 
mtm~nh1p '"' 10 lhf' state "'htrt 1hr rffec-t of doing so 'AOUld bf- to cubJtCt lht or~an1ut1on 's 
nwmbus to rconom1c rtprical loc...' nf tmplo~ mtnt , or ph,-c1cal cotreton F I . Lou1s1ana tJ rtl 
Grtm1l110n v NAACP, J66 S 19J . 295-'16 ( 19611 (upholdon~ ltmpora" 1n1uncli0n r<s ra1n1ng 
tnforctmtnl or \l.illUlt' rf'qu1rintt Cnta1n nol ·fur ·profit or •• ln1tallun' In flit mtmbf>r\hlp h h) 
Balu \ (It\ or Lill~ Roel . J61 u 516 517 (1%0l l1n\ahrt111n~ OCCUJl•llonal hctn .. tu 
>t.ttutt which rrquortd mtmb<r hop h ti . '\ .\ . \CP ' Alab•m• JS l l ' ~ UQ, 406 (195~1 
67 Fle><ida Lq11lallvt lnvnllphon Comm , J72 US SJ9, S46 (1'16JI 
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the government's ability to pursue its goal in a manner less intrusive on 
fundamental personal liberties . 69 
Utilizing this balancing standard, courts have held it constitutional 
for the United States to compel private citizens to disclose their 
contrib~tions to presidential campaigns, 70 to require private lobbyists 
for foreign governments to register, 71 and to require citizens acting as 
tn:n 1( &n\ dtttrrtnt d!ttt on tht tXtrCIK of first Amtndmtnl nir:hts anJ;ts, not throu~h dirtct 
jr:O\ trnmtnl actt0n, but 1nd1rtctly as an un1nttndtd but 1ntv1tablt ruull of tht JO\ trnmtnt 's 
conduct 1n rtqu1nng dis<losure " Id at 6S (c1hn1 NAACP v Alabama . JS7 US 449. <bl ll918U 
b9 Lamont\" Postmast•r C•n. Jll JOI. JIO (19651 (Br•nnan, j. concumn~I. ~h•ho 
;,,,,.,:.~~~::;,~~~~~~~~Th11 ad hoc anc1n~ tut has bttn cr1t1cu:rd ioi Dfina · ·MJ 
uns rue urt t at It can hardl} bt Mscribrd as a Nit of lur.1 at all .. T EmHson. Thr )strm of 
Frttdom or Espru.,on 16 (19701 Nr\"•rth•lus, th• Supr•me Court 1n Buckl•> , \'al•u. <I• 
U S I (19761 (p<r cunam), uKd th• balancing tut and acknowl<dg•d that th• JO• trnm•nt&J 
inltrut in d1sclosurt must bt wtiJhed against not onl~ tht dam~ to tht 1ndl\:1dual\ ln\ohtd 
but also th• Injury sufl•rtd by th< pubhc al larg•. Id at 64-61 Bwc•t.1. how•v<r, mad< u morr 
d1fficull to pro,·• a constitutional abnd&•ment by rtquinng •v1d<ne< or such probabl• hara."m•nl 
rtsulhng lrom dasclosur< u wu found 1n NAACP v Alabama, JS7 U S 449, •61 119181 •I• 
U S at 72 Accord1n1 to Ch1.r JuslK• Burs<r, th11 incr<U<d •v1d•nhary burden on 1111,•nts 
chalkng1ni compelled disclosure matks a d•partur• from th< "h1stonc sar.guards 1uaran1rrd by 
th• First Amendment " Id al 2JI Burs<r. C . concumn1 in part and di ... nhn 
70 · UC <O, 424 US I (1976) (p<r C 
tquinln•rif or lht t«f<ral Eltttion Campa Cl o( 1971. 2 us c ti 4Jl-4S6 (lq761 that 
ht1cal commmtu record and transmit to llw eovernment tht namts or 1nd1v1duals contributins 
1n tacu.s or ltn dollars 10 pohucal commltltts or 1ndtpe:ndent cand1da1ts TM Court < ons.uitrtd 
tht substantial ~ovtrnmtntal anttrest 1n maintaining tht 1nlt«nt~ of lht tltttoral pr0<t~\ to k of 
such ma1n1tudt u to outweigh tht pouib1hl) of first amtndmtnt mfnngtmtnts 414 L' ~ at 
66-68 Tht Coun uphtkl lht ttn.-dolla.r minimal threshold rtpor11nJ rtqu1rtment ba.,fd ui11on 1 
findin' that It wa.s not 1rratH>nal Id at SJ This ddertnce to a complu con~rtss1onal JUd1o?mtnt 
rtprtsirnts 1ht Court's hu1taoon 10 substuu1r us JUd~menl for that of the ltgHlaturt ~,, ShC'hon 
' Tuck<r. Jb4 US 479, 490 (1960) (Frankfun<r. j. d1u•nhngl. </ 1d al 41 r1r,1•IJ1i\f 
abndJmtnt (Of first amendment rrttdoms) mU)( be: \' ltWtd In lht hJhl or ltS5 dra,11< mum. for 
ach1<ving th< sam• basic purpooe ·i 1roocnot• omut<d) 
tn a shghtl> d1rrtrtnt contnt, Sl1tllo,.•s leut restnct1Ye alternall\'C ltSt has bttn mort 
stnns•ntl> apph<d In Pollard v Robrru, llJ F Supp HI (E D Ark ), a./f'd '" '"""'" JqJ 
US 14 (19681, th• d11tncl court <nj011"'d a qu.., ·grand jury 1nvut1pl1on which hail sub-
piocnatd usenl1aJly lhe contributor hit of the Arkansas branch of tht Natt0nal Rtpu t.lu "" l',tr1) 
Tht pros.ttutor 1nutd the subpoena 1n the rourw of his 1nvuugauon or poss1blt t"lt"t11on la• 
\'1ol1t1ons The court. rtl)1ng on tht pnnc1plts of Shtllo,., held that "f\•en 1f a h)latC" can 
lt11:1t1mattl~ compel a hm1ttd d1telosurc of 1nd1v1duals artihattd with a Jroup . 11 d<M' ' not f1•llo• 
that tht (s~ate can comprl a sv.•rep1n11: and 1nd1scrim1na1e 1dcnt16ca11on of all of 1h~: nwm1 .,., .. nf 
irou1> in l'"<Ct\ .. of tht lsllatt's lc11:1t1matt nnd for 1nformatton Id 111 i t.· 
71 ht repon1ni rtqu1rements of I t ort1gn A1ttnls tgu ra ion c o 19JK .. .. .tm1·111k<t 
11 l SC: ~~ 601 611 (1976). °"'ert uphtld •Jain ta first amtndmc-nt challtn~t in .\ 11 .. 111n 1.1 n 
' Irish :" Aid Comm . J46 F upp IJl4 IJ89·91 tS D !'\ \'I. '"' dt•"d <(lo l " ' t•I I 
I t SU an • l ' .1 
lt11:111matc ll:O\trn~nt intcrut-1nformin~ tht iovtrnmcnt and tht public a.s to MMJrt•· .. 111 f11 h·1in 
propqanda-and lhAt the 1ovtmmcnt 1ntcrut outv.eaghed "'an) pou1blt 1nfrin«tmtnt 11( 1hr fu .. 1 
a.mtndmtnt nghts of tht defendant's mtmbtrs or contnbutors .. Id at IJ91 Tht •OUrl •as 
careful to emphuut lht vuaJ govemmenul interest 1n safeguarding our poht1cal prtXtU from 
unacknowl•dged foreign 1nftu•n<H and, On th< bulJ or th ... COnC<rns and thr for•«U 
comphca11ons wuh Unn<d Statu lomsn polK), r<Jttt<d th• first am•ndmrnt claim Id 
1980) I TELL/GENCE GATllERING 897 
agents of a foreign power to disclose the details of their agency and 
their activities.72 The law is less settled, however, when the govern-
ment obtains information about an individual's acllv111es without his 
consent, and under circumstances in which that person is not sub1ect 
to legislative, judicial or administrative compulsion Judicial opinions 
indicate t hat it is not unconstitutional for an undercover agent in a law 
enforcement investigation to obtain information that a person i willing 
to disclose, even though that disclosure is induced by some form of 
deception . 73 Nevertheless, when the information disclosed concerns 
political activities and is gathered by a law enforcement agency for 
purposes other than criminal prosecution the practice may be uncon-
stitutional. 7• 
1c statutes requmng tht re'"lra ion I\ 1< u.1 i oro'rganuallons 
that Krvt: ass kHmtn or a tnU for, or rtte1ve mont from. fort111:n ,.;O\trnmtnts f1rs1 11 
(1976) provides th.at anyoM w o acts a.s an a~cnt of a fort1Jn prmnpa mu.st filt a 
rtctstralJOn .s tmtnt "'1th the Auornty General The rtg1~uauon stattmcnt must conlam a 
thorough ducnpllon of the reg1.slrant 's bu.s.aneu and tmplo cu tht a nc rd1ttonsh1p, and tht 
acbvibts ~rm~ fgr lh• ,Principal Sttond t 951 (19761 ••quirts th•• an on• wlio 
an a tnt o( a forc11n 1ovcrnmcnt mu.st noufy the ~crctary of tatt Third . _ _..._._.._ 
l..!lJl6~=(~1~97:;6F.f rov1dcs that organ1zauons whKh accept support from fort1gn ~o,·trnmtnt.s mu.st 
,..,mr with lh• Allorn<y C•neral 1! th•Y •n1ac• 1n act1v111u du1gned 10 forcubl1 control or 
owrthrow the Un1ttd States government. or If they enga.gt: 1n acuv111cs const1tut1ng m1htary 
traln1n1 This statul• has bttn succusfully chall•ng•d und<r th• filth amrndmrnt Srr Alh<rt>On 
bv•nlv• Achvll1u Control 8d , Jl2 U S. 7Q...2.?.· 78 (196S 
73 The uSoC of informers or infiltrators 1n a cnm1nal 1n'·;su~at1on docs not ,i,-, rist to an) 
VIOIAUOn of th< first or fourth amendments Handschu \" prcial S.rv• 01" J49 F ~ 766 
769 (5 D N Y 1912 or ourt amen ment purpost1, a person assume the risk that an)· known 
party o a con enauon concun1n« cnm1nal conduct 1s an undtrco,·tr pol1ct 111.tnl F. I , Hoffa v 
Un11ed Statu, JIS us zqJ, JOO.OJ (1966), UWIS v Unu•d latu, Jll l' s IOb , 111 (19661 fh• 
fourth amendmcnl , howtvtr , docs restrict 1he teopc of ptrm1i,1blc 1rt1nllt) of an undtrCO\tr 
acrnl Stt, t I , Cooled v Un1trd Statu, 2SS US 291 . J04 Ob 11921111nforman1 o•.,sl<pp<d 
conslltulJOnal bounds whtn he obt.1.1ned entry into bu)lntss oftlet of 'u\PfCI b' dtctption ind 
1tttttJy ranloAcked office and 1t11ed 1ncnm1nallng documtnls, lnfiltrallon for l1w ·tnforctmtnl 
purposts into a pohhcal organ1ut1on or rally whKh m1~ht dampen th• urrCI,. or first amrnd· 
mrnt nshu of lh• parbc1pants has also bttn upheld Soc1ahst Workrrs Party v Anorney C•n • 
419 US IJl4, IJ19·20 (1974), United Statts v Mcl<od , JBS F Id 7J< . 710 lSth Cir 19671 
Ntvtrthtlus, btcauSt of the 1nhtrtnt danger that fir t 1mtndmtnl 1ct1\ 1llt"i ml\ bt )l•n16c1ntl) 
1mpa.11td , undercover 1nveit1•at1ons 1n university clasws or poli11c1I or•an1111ton mtctm11:s will be: 
wll&J.Md Only If thtre 15 a SUb$llnhal COYtrnment 1nltrcst lO JUSllf)" lht probablt 1mpa1rmtnt Of 
6rsl am<ndm•nt n•hll Whur v Dav11. IJ Cal Jd 7S7 . 768 ·7 I. s.JJ P 1d 111 12q Jl. 120 Cal 
r 94, IOl-04llQ7Slhn bank · "' Sociah< '"''Ctn 41~ l ~al IJl9 
Co,.por \lhllr• Oa\I•, IJ al 2d 7S7 , 77J HI Pld 111 11 . li ll (JI Rpll Q4 104 
(197SJ (1n lrtYtrs1n« demurrer of pla1nt1ff 's complaint and find1n,r: 1h.u pollct unclC'r<O\tr 
\Untilla.nct on un1\tr II\ U1mpu\ . "hK'h ,.;alhtrtd 1nfMma111tn th.11 pt· r1A1ntri 111 no 1lltul 
Kh\'lh Wl-UJ>rim1 (ac1r \IOlaoon of first amcndmt'nl ris:h1 .. 1 111 1 t \l' >r.ict ar• t 
omm v Gra" ..aw d \16 . JJl· JJ tld Cir IQ; H ldfhrmintc. d1 .. m1 .. ·JI o ( compl.11nt an<I 
6nd1ng pohct sunr1llanct of 1 large ant1"ar dtmon\tr111on 10 lK· a rw:rfn1l\ lo1\\ful mC'lhod uf 
pruitn·1n1 public iaftt) ind dtterr1ng \'IOltnce) , urt drnlf'd, -'I Ii ~..a8 1 l~ i ..a) ond Andl'r)On 
v Sills. S6 NJ 110. 229-JI. 265 A 2d 6'8, 618·89 (19701 (rtHrsing 1n1unr1ion or Yold .. prtad 
PGIK• surv<1llance proSram and holding that, ab,.nt proor or bad lauh or arb1trar1n.,s , thr 
Eucuuve Branch should perform .. detcctaonal and prcvenuvc" funcuons and athtr an) 1nfor· 
D\ation rca.sonabh bcheved to bt necessary without ud1c1al 1ntcrftrcnttJ s,, irnrYolll otc , 
: I 
CI ~p.S 
'"" h, 1..$ 
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Although these decisions are helpful, they do not specifically addrc 
the different considerations that exist when the information is soug~~ 
by an intelligence agency for intelligence-gathering rather than law. 
enforcement purposes . 75 If the government can compel agents of 
foreign powers to register and describe their political activities, is it 
unconstitutional to place covert domestic agents in tho. e same foreign 
agent groups to obtain information?76 Case law indicates there is n 
absolute answer and that each situation must be carefully cons1dercdo 
balancing both the need of the government and thr effect on th~ 
individual . 77 
The Executive Branch has tried to provide some guidance 1n this 
area. President Carter's Executive Order on United tales Intelligence 
Activities generally prohibits an intelligence agenc) from covertly 
placing agents in any organization in the United States unless the 
organization is acting on behalf of a foreign power and is primarily 
composed of individuals who are not United States persons , 71 or unless 
the infiltration is undertaken on behalf of the FBI as part of a lawful 
bureau investigation . 79 The order also permits agencie to have em-
ployees participate in organizations, without disclosure of their intelli-
D~slic lottU11<'4Ct l'lf""""•l1, Utt Frrsl Ao1ud111tol ood lltt Nttd/or PnorJudrcral Rt11r,., 
26 Buffalo L Rev 17J (1976), Nott, C111Jcm111t•l4I INW1tr1a1ia.1 of tltt Exncut of F,,.,1 
A•1t•d111tol R11/o11 C11iuNJ' R11/o11 aod Rt111td1t1, 60 Minn. L . Rtv 1 7 1976) 
. • nrt Lu v . nu tau •L Court (~ith), 407 S 197, JIO (1971) 
(u~nd1nc rourlh amendment to domHtoc security tltttron1c surwillances), Zwe1bon v Mitchtll 
Sl6 F 2d S94, 611 -IJ (0 C. Cir 197S) (en bane) (n~nd1na rourth amendmtnl lo nauonal steum; 
el«tronoc surveillance), cm dto1td, 42S US 944 (1976) 
76 ere vtry e rea ause OT"Tht 1 cuhy or 1uo\'1ng 1ufft'ntn 
speciftc inJunes to overcome the thrtshokl cue and controversy st.And1n« rtqu1rtmtnt u 
articulated in Laird v Tatum, 408 U.S I (1972) Mere alltgauons or a subJtctovt chtlhna impact 
o( 1ove.mmtnl s.urveiUance on first amendment acttv1t.e1 11 not an adtquatt bas1.s for JUSIKtab&I· 
lty. Id at 12-IJ Alleca.toons or dJSruploon, huusmcnt, or bad , .. lh.,. cenually r<quortd btlo .. 
ono can htoeate first am•ndmtnt rights whtn 1nltlh1tnc• actoviti<s .,. onvolvtd £ Bubn 
~mocrauc Oub v Rumsftld, 410 F Supp 144, 149-SI (0.0 C. 1976) 
77 Buckley v Valeo, I (ptr cunam) lht Court reru .. d 10 ~ranl a blankrt 
tstmphon r m t tde:ral contn utor reportang requirements for aJI minor part1ts and 1ndtptn· 
dent candrdatu Id al 74 lnsttad , tht Court Htabhshtd a cast-by-cue proctdurt whoch allowi 
u.ch such party to prove that disclosure o( contnbutor hsts "'oufd sub,u.nuaJlv 1mriair 1u 
mtm~rs· const1tuoonal nghts Id Smet BMc*lty, pohocal parhu ha\.~ h.u1 \U\lnl \UCCt"i 1n 
the: lowtr courts Co'"'°'t W1Kons1n Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Comm "'" ~1cCann. 41J 
F Supp S40, S48-49 (E .O Wis 1977) t1niunctoon issued rthtVln& party from compliin~ •llh 
Wucons1n Campaign financang Act) a"d Partido Nutvo Progres1sll ,. Htrn•ndu Colon 41~ f 
Supp 4'5 , 482-BJ (0 p R 1976) (ptr cuna.m) (ln)U nct1on IJSUtd proh1b111n• lht U<t or ~O\tln 
ment inspectors to enforce Puerto RKo') pohuc~I contribution and d13closurr .. 1Jluh·· u·11l1 OrtJon 
Socialist Worktr• 1974 Cam.,.,1gn Comm v Paulus, 4J2 F Supp 125S, l/~q 60 t D Or 19;;1 
(lnjunct.aon derued where Ore,:on Campaign O.sclosurt Act wu found to have minimal 1mpall on 
first amendmtnl roehts of par~l;?'.Y!,.l ----------------------
78. Ste not• 61 1• 
79. Exte . Order No 120J6, I 2-207(a), J C. F R 112, 127 (1979) 
., 
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nee affiliation, in certain narrow circumstances under publicly avail -
~le guidelines app~oved by the Attor~~y ~eneral 10 The CIA, for 
instance, is not required to disclose parllc1pat1of ndby a
1 
ge~cy ~md~l~dyeeals 
. domestic organizations for the purpose o eve oping in 1v1 u 
~iations and credentials needed to substantiate a cover employ-
nt." Approval of such undisclosed participation must be given by 
inc appropriate CIA senior official, and all such approvals are subject 
:: review by the Attorney Gcneral .12. These procedure~ go ~onside.r~bly 
beyond the requirements of any existing statute or JUd1c1al dec1s1on . 
They reflect an awareness of the chilling effect that undisclosed 
government involvement may have on the exercise of first amendment 
freedoms and privacy. Thus, t~e procedures attempt to balance ~he 
competing interests of the ind1v1dual and the government by defining 
categories of permissible participation and by requiring appropriate 
review in each case 
B. Fourth Amfndment Issues 
Another constitutional provision often al issue in intelligence gather-
ing is the fourth amendment's prohibiti~n ag~inst unre~~able 
searches and seizures .u Intelligence techniques involve lrad1t1onal 
searches as well as the utilization of new technology that has not yet 
IO. fE."tcutoH Ordtr 120J6 a~ th< proctduru adopttd pursuant lo 1t hav d formal 
~er this StnSlhW form or 1nr~maloon galhtnng •« r r No 120J6, f 2-207, J 
CF R Ill, 117 (1979 u1dthnt:1 hl\f becn 1pprovc l us ar or t t , I c t 
rrns.t , an I Su nott 14 u1pro s.,1 stt Wisconsin Soc11hst Worktrs l976 Campa11n 
Comm v McCann , 4JJ F Supp S40, S48 (E 0 Wis 1977) (pnor 10 adop11on ol Extcull\t 
Onkr 110J6 and pubhc proctdurts, tht court txprt\Sf'd skepUc1sm 1h1t harusmcnt of d1uidtnt 
polrucal groups had bttn t<rmonattdl 
11 Tht CIA gu1dthnu authon1t und1KloK<I paruc1p.hon in orgAn11:auons 1n tht Unutd 
Stalu •to dt\tlop assoc•ataons and crfdtntJab to be uuhud for purposes rtl111n1 to forc11n 
•ttlhctncc u for eu.mple by J01n1n1 an organLlat1on to whKh an tmploycc •oukl ordinarily be 
aptcltd to b<lona 1r hos covu tmploymenl wtr< hos trut employmtnt " Such und1sclostd 
particlpauon as abo perm111cd "to ob1a1n tr11n1n1 or tducahon rcltvant to CIA emplorment 
10 obtain pubhcauons of organ1utt0ns whose membus.h1p H optn to tht gentral publtc to 
m1Jnt.a1n or tnhance the quahficatt0n1 or CIA empk>)ttS, and to makt 11 possible: for thtm lo sta' 
abrta.\.I of de,·tlopmtnts In their field s or profcss.onal UJ>fr11st lO mamt.a1n the CO\ tr o( CIA 
prnonntl. pro,rams and rac1ht1cs • h1ch arc not pubhcl) ackno"' ledKtd u such b' the Unutd 
Sutts Go\·trnmC"nl to uuhu 1nd1\lduab on a • lllln~ or volunlar"· ba\1S "ho arc mtmbfr1 of 
an or1an1za11on within 1he Un1ltd Stites to develop persons or fort1gn na11on1hty as sourus or 
rontacts for purposts rtlaltd to fort1,n 1nttlh,tncf to plart tmplO\tfS in an or11anua11on 
•11h1n the United lltts to 1dent1h and devtlop ptnon' or fort1gn nauon1ht)· u 10urcr1 or 
<ontacts for JlUrpoK1 rtlatffl to forr1,n 1nttll1ccn<t (andl tn prottct tht dr11rct of IA inttrot in a 
putKular forttgn 1nttlhgtnCf subJtCl mattu, but hm1ted to part1c1pa11on 1n an or,1n11111on 1h•t 
prmuts such part1c1pat1on by eovunment employees 1n thear official capac111cs " Srt note I• 
"' IJ Exte Order No 120J6, I Z-207, J CF R 112, 127 (1979) 
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been considered by the courts. The FISA14 requires that a court Ord ~ 
be obtained ~or .most trad.itional forms of wiretapping or eavesdroppi:r 1 
conducted w1thm the United States . 15 Such a warrant is also requirJ ' 
before the government employs most surveillance devices in the Unit d ·~ 
States to gather information under circumstances where there is ~ \: 
reasonable expectation of privac warrant would be re uire a ~ 
law-enf rcement pur oses."16 For example, cons1 er t e mstrume l 
n~w~ as a. b~eper . !s device is attached to a vehicle and emi~ 
periodic radio signals which enable the person monitoring the device t 
determine the location of the vehicle. The FISA does not require ~ 
court order before a beeper can be used lo determine the location of 
foreign agent's car unless, under applicable decisions, a court ord a 
would be require? if the FBI used such a device lo locate a bane~ 
robber. !hus, while the fourth amendment's applicability to the use of 
beepers 1s not yet completely clear, these devices have been involved i 
~um~rous crimina! cases and there is some judicial precedent to whic~ . : 
mtelhgence agencies can turn for guidance. 17 
(," ed< -JF' s-~~8~.==:s:: .. =n=ot=.=.=.=7==_5"'0"',"'w"',·, ...... a .. n·d•ao:c::::co=m·p .. an=y·in~c:...ta_t ___ =,,,.,=------=~1 
85 50 U.S.CA H 1801-1804 (Wut Supp 1979 
86. I f I 4 St nott 48 •w i:r..h:-:'.e"'d:l'.r:'.:a7.ft.e'.'.'rs:'.'."'o'.'.':f:""F;:-::ISA=-:-- re-:l~ie-:d-o-n-.the-~Su-pr-t­
ourt'• decision 1n Katz v . Uni tates, J89 U.S. J47 0967>. and Int.ended the statute to ,.a: 
t~olving conctpU of tht fourth amendmtnt .. interpreted by the courts. Thus, the legulati,.. 
hutory of FISA manifuu Congrus' Intention to Incorporate the Kan standard for cons1ttution-
ally prottcttd Prl\'&Cy interests into tht definition or tltctronk surveillance. which strYts to 
acth-att th• stalut• '• requiremenu S Rep No 604, 95th Cong., ht Sess 4-18 (19771, rt~••ttd 
1n (1978) U.S Code Cong & Ad News J904 , J905-20 
87 Most circuits have rttognb:ed that the ust o( beepers to trace 1.1rplants or automobiles oa 
pubhc thoroughCares does not 1mplicalt the founh amendment primarily btcause thut 11 00 ' 
reasonable expectation of privacy 1n activ1ttu thal are readily ob .. rvablt in public . £ 1 , United 
Statts ,. Bruneau , 594 F 2d 1190, 1197 (8th Cir I (airplaM), cert . dtnitd, 100 S Ct 94 11979~ 
United Statu v Curtu, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977) (airplaM), cm. dtnttd, 4J9 U.S .;; 
910 (1978). United Statu v Hufford, 5J9 F 2d J2 , JJ-J4 (9th Cir I (automobile). «rt d<•ttd, 429 ! 
U.S 1002 (19761 But stt United Statu v Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir 1975) " 
(automobile) (holding u .. of betper to track vth1cles 1mpingu upon re .. onablt upectation ot . f 
privacy), affd tn ban< by tquaUy d1u1dtd '"""· 5J7 F 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
Sub~uent decisions, howtve:r , 1nd1cale thal tht original panel decision 1n Hol'"ts 15 not I.ht 
.. uled law of tht fifth Circuit United States v Conroy. 589 F 2d 1258, 126J & n 5 (Sth Cir I. 
«rt dtnttd, too S Ct 60 (19791. United States v Chuhire . 569 F 2d 887 . 888 (5th Cir 1. rm 
d'nud . H 7 t; S 90; tl9781 The First Circuit ha> concluded that althou•h the US< of a lxr[ltrlo 
lra c ~ an au1o mo b1lt constllut ts a starch "'uh in tht mtanimt of tht fourth amtndm,·nt ttu 
lesstnrJ txpcctauo n of prt\' l l ) auoc1attd with an auwmob1lt 1ust1fies tht uw: of 1 btcPfr ¥.1thou1 
a "''arrant Unittd Statt~ ' Moorf' ~ t.1 F l d 106. 111 11 f Jc.t Cir 197iL ,,.,, dnttnl . ..i ,~ r "-
~lb 1 1 ~;s1 
S1 m1la rh , thr platrmt111 of a het•f>t•r ln 'ldt t11n1 rah:in<l 1' nul a '('arth \\tlh1n lh t nu.111111i: nf 
tht founh amrndmt•nt IM:<.au:.c there ran lx· nu obJrt t1 v.-h JU 11fiablt t<JCIH:'llallun 111.11 lht 
possession of an 1lhc1t Hem or stolen good '"" no1 be tractd b\' government authontlt'.) f. I , 
United Statu v Pringle. 516 f .Zd 1114. l l 19 t5th Cir 19781 lbt<per placed in con1raband matll. 
United Stal<• v Emtf) , Ht F 2d 887 , 889-90 list Cir 1976) (beeper placed 1n contraband 
package). Jtt United States v Dubrohky, 581 F Zd 208 , 111 - ll (9th Cir 19781 (beeper placed ill 
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The rapid development of technology, however, permits intelligence 
agencies to use surveillance devices that have never had the benefit of 
judicial review. As each new technique is considered, the Department 
of Justice must determine whether it is necessary to seek court ap-
proval before using the device . The FISA thus poses a problem . The 
court's jurisdiction under the Act is limited to issuing orders for 
electronic surveillance as defined in the Act. 11 Yet the definition of 
electronic surveillance itself requires consideration of judicial interpre-
tations of the fourth amendment, and there may not be any precedent 
covering a particular new technology . For example, case law indicates 
that a court order must be obtained before a microphonic surveillance 
device is used to intercept a private conversation if the communicant 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.H The cases, however, do not 
clearly define the limits of such an expectation . Placing such a listening 
device in a home, office, or other private location requires a warrant. 90 
Using a tape recorder to record a conversation that can be heard by an 
individual lawfully in an adjacent room does not require a warrant.¥• 
Use of a parabolic microphone, such as those used by television crews 
to enhance the entertainment value of professional football, may well 
require a warrant . 91 It is often difficult, therefore, to determine when a 
particular surveillance technique requires a warrant. For instance, 
contuband pac el. ntted tales v Bishop, 5JO F 2d 1156, t 157 (5th Cir I (beeper in .. rted 
11 11olcn bait money), art dt•itd, 429 U .S 848119761 The plae<mcnt of a beeper in a lawfulh 
poue:sstd 1te:m, however , IS a search w1th1n lhe meantnti: o( the fourth amendment and rtquirts a 
warrant , particularl) whtn 1t can tract a person ·, mo\tmtnt wuhin a home Un11e-d Statts " 
Moort , 562 F 2d l06, l ll- IJ list Cir 19i7) (betper placed 1n noncontraband pack•Rel . rut 
"°''d· 4J5 U.S. 926(19781. United States v Baile,'. 465 F Supp 1138. ll41 (£ D Mich 19791 
(bttptr placed in noncontraband packaR•I But'" United Stales,. Peru . 526 F 2d 859 . 862 (5th 
Ci.r) (bttptr placed m ttltnsion stl rtrtl\'td 1n txchanti:t for Cf')ntraband). urt dfnud, 419 U S 
146 (19761 Stt r<nrral/y Marks & Batt) . Elutron1< Tra<l1n1 Dn11<t1 Fourth A"'r"d"''"' 
,,.b/t,., and Solutio•J. 67 Ky L J 987 (1978-1979). Nole. Tra<l••r Dnmt1 a•d tht Fourth 
A•tod•tnt, IJ US F L Rt\· lOJ (19781. Noc. . Tra<l1n1 Aat; Brrprrs , Pnw<> ••d thr 
f .. rlh A10t•d,,,tnt, 86 \'ale L 1461 119771 
U 50 1801 10 (West up 
19 Katz v United Stales. J89 US J47 ( 19671. is the .. minal caS< proh1b1llnR th• v.arranllus 
Wit or tltcttonk SUrveillanCt dt\'ICtS 't4' htn tht tara:et ha.s a rtasonablf- txpttlallOO or pn"ac y 
Tlllt Ill of lht Omnibus Crim• Conlrol and Saft Strttl• Act of 1968. 18 I.! SC H 15 10 l <lO 
11qi6). imposts cnmmal µ~nalt1ts. ,., \ H 11, and au1honzts U'(O\ (' f\ or t I\ 11 ct a mJS:l'' " ' ~ 
HlO for lh<' \\anantlt, .. U-.t" or bu1t .. or \\lfflflJJ "' In certain f HtU m'tanll'' 
90 Stt Btrtttr \ ~~\\ 'or~ t8lS r ~ 41 t l 96:1 th ra n1r:m,r. f'.t \t'Vtroppu1c "' 11hm tht· µu r\U' \\ 
of lht fourth amtndmtnll 
91 
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suppose an intelligence agency is able to use a normal , readily . 
~ble ~pe recorder lo listen lo s?unds that are discernible, thoug~v~. 
mlelhgible, to the human ear without any physical intrusion and th ot 
~ubj~t. that recording _t<~ audio enh.ancement to render the sou en 
mtelhg1ble. Is that activity one which would require a warran ~ 
undertaken for law enforcement purposes? The answer is not clear~ 
ons1 er a s1m1 ar issue . o one would suggest that the FBI 
obtain a warrant before reading the daily newspaper. The FBI must 
act on the basis of information contained in lhe paper without~ 
sli.gh~est sugge~tion tha~ it has undertaken a search . If members of 
1 cnmmal conspiracy decide to use the classified advertisement section f : 
the paper to communicate their plans, an FBI agent may certainto 
read that same section and , if clever enough, discove r the conspira y . 
The situation is undoubtedly the same if the advertisement is pct 
lished in a foreign language . Suppose, however , the conspiratu · 
ber h . d . . ors 1eve t. e.1r a .vertl~ement is ~ompletely indecipherable by outsiders 
because 1t 1s written m a complicated mathematical code generated b ~ 
a computer that is beyond the state of the art. Assume further that th~ 
FBI is able to break that code by using an even more sophisticated 
computer. Surely most people would agree that the FBI has not 
undertaken a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
The answer, ~owever , is uncertain . It is, of course , possible to argue 
that the conspirators had a reasonable expectation that their communi 
cations were secret. Nevertheless, the decision to put those communi· 
cations in the public domain, even though in cryptic form, may justify 
the conclusion that their privacy expectation is not one that the cou rti 
are pr~pared to protect from governmental surveillance. This analys' 
rests, m part, on reported cases which indicate that one who broad· 
casts a message on a radio, a public communications medium, does not 
have an expectation of privacy, 94 and in part, on cases which permit 
police, without a warrant , to take trash from outside a person's home 
and subject it to chemical analysis to determine whether any drugs 
have been discarded ." 
Westin , Snf"ct, Prit>ary, 011d Frrrdowt / uu;s a'"' PropflJalsfor lhr lv i1I'« 1p1 .. 1.11 bt1 ( 'olum 
L Rtv IOOJ . llOS ll'l66) 
9J Stt nott 92 ••Pr• 
94 Un1tt'd Statts ,. Hall, .tft8 F lrl 10). 101\ (Qth Cir 197 .\l fhnlc11111! th.-r1 , .. n11 ft",1 .. onJhlt 
txpntal1on of prl\"l f\ 1n a ra(ho-ttltphunr com tr~t1on 1ha1 could l1t· n·n1\ t<d h' lo!''nfrilh 
l\111lablt ract10-rt'Crp11on l'C1u1pm('nt). \ ' 111h'<I ~1.ll<'"' Jl uffa . .iJ6 F Jd I.' 1 ~ 1•1; 1;1h tu Ju;(lt 
(holding thert ll no rta'()n .. bl~ 0i)("Cl3llOO ur IJrl\ 'U) 10 a ltlt1)ht10C' CHO\ t•r~ll•111 frum .t moluk 
telephone unit that can ~ rtct1vtd l>)' an ordinary commt"rcial FM radio rt'Ctl\ tr). art d""''· 
400 u.s 1000 (1971) 
9S . Unittd Stat .. v Crowell, S86 F Id 1020, 1024-lS l4th Cir IQ78l. 1 trl 1frnmJ, 440 U.S. 
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mpts to apply case law in novel contexts, are typical of those 
atttscnted to the Department of Justice . The precedents developed and 
P"fes promulgated by the Justice Department, however, are often not 
ru b'ect to judicial review or public comment. Thus, the American 
su . J ciple of checks and balances can be eviscerated when it comes to 
Pr:;;ligence activities . It is extremely important , therefore, that we 
~n titutionalize in the Executive Branch a process for obtaining a 
ins ltiplicity of views on the fundamental legal issues arising from 
~~lligence activities .96 For example, in the Justice Department , the 
~ttorney General receives advice on these matters from former CIA 
ployees , members of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the 
~partment's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review . It is likewise 
important for intelligence agencies t? . encourage mean.ingful. in -~ou~e 
riticism of their proposals. The ability to argue against his clients 
c roject is one of the most difficult , but most important, skills a lawyer 
~ust acquire if his practice is to meet minimal standards of social 
responsibility 97 This is particularly true in the government. This 
process of debate , considerati?n o~ conflictin~ .opinions, and careful 
review will help ensure that intelligence dec1s1ons are properly and 
legally made . Although this process may not always result .in perfect 
legal decisions, it will at least guarantee that the legal issues are 
considered, the appropriate questions asked, and reasonable conclu· 
sions reached . 
IV . THE FUTURE OF I NTELLIGENCE LAW 
The evolution of the law applicable to intelligence act1v1t1es is 
directly influenced by world conditions. The current emphasis on le~al 
guidelines for intelligence operations is a result of past exces~es which 
were disclosed during a period in our history when a President was 
forced out of office and an unpopular war was prolonged despite 
vigorous public dissatisfaction .91 Current events, however , may pro· 
voke a different analysis. Some may now argue that attempts to 
rtgulate intelligence activities are futile and self-destr~cti~e . ?thers 
may seriously question the costs and benefits of regulation 1.n v1.ew ~f 
the enormity of hostile acts abroad . While such reexamination IS 
n~essary and constructi,·e. it should not cause us to lose sight of the 
past. Watergate did happe n CHAOS and COl:'\T E LPRO were actual 
programs. 99 Those abuses had their beginning~ 111 action which aµ -
JlCared neces<ar~· and rea•onable to the official who be!(an them As 
the programs grew . howe,·er, the jlbtificat1011' <''pand1·d and re:>pon· 
~1bility c)j,,appt'ared 
96 Stt note 26 Jupro and accompany101: tot 
9; Stt ABA Canons of Profts.tonal Ethtn ?'o S 
91 Stt note 9 supra and accompanymg tun 
99 Stt C hurch Comm11ttt Rtport , ••P•• nolt 9, I B~ I ll 
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The proliferation of law governing intellip:encc art1v1lle has n t" 
been entire~y without cost It has limited some of the flexibility an~ · 
ease of action formerly enjoyed by intelligence officials 100 We hav, , 
gained, however, much more than we have lost Intell1p:ence agencies 
~o~ operate under the ~ost lucid statements of authority, and lirn. 
1tatJons thereon, ever available . The protection of ind1v1dual rights and 
liberties from infringement by intelligence activities 1s at a high point ( 
'."'t the .same time, there are few, if any. cases in ll'h1ch 1t has prov,d ~. 
1mposs1ble under the law to collect truly vital intclhp:ence information lo 
Rather, intelligence officials think more carefull~ and answer mor~ 
precisely before proposing or authorizing particular a1 ll\'ll1es 
Nevertheless, there is still more work to be done in this area 
Existing law provides inadequate protections to the people who serv~ 
our nation as intelligence officers . They need. and deserve, bett,r ) 
protection against those who would intentionall~ r!1sclose their secret 
mission and jeopardize their safety' by revealinp: their 1den11t1es. Al- f. 
though public comment and criticism of intellip:en e act1vit1es and . 
specific operations is proper, exposing the ident1t1e of particular 1.· 
intelligence personnel and thereby placing them in danger erves not 
legitimate p.urpose . Our proper concern for individual liberties must be 
~ ~alanced with a concern for the safety of those who erve our nation in · 
/ ifficult times and under dangerous conditions. 10 We must also adopt 
100 s,,. t I , Ht•""'' o" HR 5110 Stfort llu S#bto'"'" 011 Gmnnmr,,1 /efo""alfo1t '"' 
/Nd1v1d•al R1cht• of th< Ho•J< G"""""''"' ~·•t10"' Co"'"' , %1h Cona . 1>1 ~. 1 
l>tatt-nt of Frank Carlucci, Otputy O.rtttor of Ctntral lnttll1atnct l I o\11rtportma d<ttom<• 
tal impact o rttdom o Jn ormalt0n ct on stcunty a e 1tnC\ o intrlh~tnct anaJ)'S&:I 
proctss and on 1nttlh11tence 11t•tht:nn,; from fore1,:n 1ntelhgence 'f'r\"l<t .. and "'>urcrs. and rtt~ f. 
mtndong that CIA bt rthtvtd from etrtaon of FOIA '> pro\'1 oon<I 
101 St:veral proposals ha\·e bttn 1ntroductd 1n Con11reu to cnminalut disclosure of u 
1ntelh1<nct a,tnt'> or oour«'> 1dtntll) £ c, S 1184, '""'" nott IS. 111 VII. Jnttlh&"'" .i 
R<form Act of 1980, S ll16, 96th Cone, Zd St , 116 ConJ Rtt !>JM. JOY 10 tda1h td Ju ~ 
14, 19801 [htmnafttr <•ltd u S ll16), S 191 , %1h Cong. Ills. .. Ill Cona Rte 5431 {daily ~'.. 
td Jan ZJ , 1919), H R Jl6Z. 96th Cong, ht St .. , 115 ConJ Rte H1J8l 1da1l) <d Apr 16, 
1979), HR 1068. 96th Con~. Ill Stu. 115 Cona Rec Hie; tt1•1h td Jan 18, 1979) •• 
Another propoql that hu r«tl\.'td cons1dtrable alltnhon 1s tht ln1rll11tnu· Jdtnu11rs ProtK· 
hon Act , HR 5615, %th on~, ht Stu, 115 Con~ Rte 119JH I< 9111 1da1h •d Oto ll, 
1979} This bill Sttks to rtstrict the d1sclosurt o( informa11on 1dtnt1h 111~ .1n' < O\ rrt 1nlf'll1rtncr 
aRtnt , tmplo\·tt. or source b~ ~rson1 "ho prewn1h ha\e ur formrr!' h.u1 .tu1hnr11c·rl a<tf'~' 10 
rla'516rc1 •o\rrnmtnt informa11on concrrnini: CO\trt u1t'nllllt' Iii ~ ~1 1 .. 11 I ht 11111 \\oultt "'"" 
proh1b1t lht d1sclosurt of 1rltnt1f, 1n• 1nformauon b' am ptrson r<·i .. rdl, ,, uf J•rt'\ mu' JO\ rrn 
mtnt .M'r\ 1ct or accu.s to cla.s 1fitd 1nforma11nn. "'ho rl1"flO~' 11 "ut1 in 1nt<"nl 10 1n1p.m "' 
1m1tf'dt:" lh< fort1Jn 1n1tll1"t'OCt:' ,uU\lllt'\ of the lnllt'd tak, 1,1 ~ .. 111d11 I he" lt1-u<riC 
Ptrman<'nl St-Itel Comm11ttt on lnttlh•f'n<t h.h ht-Id Marin~' on 1111 prulM"'·'' 
Tht .\dm1n1strat1on 'UPJJOrl' an all<"rnatl\ r propo'l.I ""hh. h "'oul1I .1 1 pr•·hihll 1hr L111n-. mi 
d1sclo)urt of 1dtn11h 1n1t information b' an\ pcr,,on act1n1: "'uh Lno\' lt-d.,:t" 1h.11 lht' rl1"Jo,urc it 
bawd on claui.fitrl 1nformat10n, and Cb) proh1b11 currtnt and formtr ~O\trnml'nt tmplo\tt!-, •ho 
havt had acctss to information concerning covut KStntll1ts in tht cour't" 0 ( their rmploHntnt, 
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to resolve the problem of graymail, where criminal 
defendants have had access to classified information escape 
punishment b threatening to disclose secret information during a 
criminal trial 10 Although it is not impossible to prosecute such 
cases the court's ability to protect legally irrelevant secret informa-
tion from unnecessary disclosure must be strengthened. 
Further protection for the intelligence community could also be 
achieved by a change in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which requires 
the timely reporting of covert action to seven congressional commit-
tees 10- This cumbersome procedure disseminates knowledge of intelli-
gence operations to such a large number of persons that the secrecy 
essential to their success becomes doubtful A carefully crafted 
amendment to the statute should re ire reportinp: only to the Senate 
and House intelligence committees 10 This would give ongress the 
from making an) d1sclosurt conctrnintt thl' 1rltnllh of ••tnts or sourcts to unauthorntd ptrsons, 
tvtn tf thl' par11cular d1sclo urc """' b.as.td purth on SJ)«ulation or pobhcl)' 1\·11lablt 
111
ronnaoon Stt llfonN&J ON S 1184 BtfoYt tlu SfnaU Stlfrt COMM on INttll•ctn<t, 96th 
Cone, ht Sts.s (1980) This alluna11vr Ytould balanct th<' nttd 10 prottet tht 1dtnt111u of covtrt 
acenu and sourcti with tht publt<'' nght to htt and optn d1scuss1on o( inttlhgtnce pohctts and 
ICtJV1lt6 
101 Thtrt art K\"tral oul.Jtandin~ leg1slat1\l' proposals to ruol vt tht gra)·ma1I probltm and 
to pttvtnt tht du.clo urt o( class1fitd 1nformahon dunn1t a criminal proctf'ding E & 1 Cbu16ed 
lnfonnahon Cnm1nal Tnal Proctduru Act , H R 4136. 96th Cona , Ill St» , IZS Con« R« 
HS1IO {daily <d Juh 11 . 191q1 H R 41J6 IS a complt• l<a• latl'< proposal whoch, '"'"oho, 
(f'tlll'S a proctdurr for ~unn~ prttnal ruhntt) to dttummt ""hcthtr cla.ss1fitd mformatton may 
br dtKlowd at prctnal or lnal procudmtt' · and authoruts thf' •o' trnmrnt to take interlocutory 
~als from adverw d1slnct cour1 ordtrs rf'la11ntt lo tht d1wloiurt o( cla»afif'd 1nforma11on Thf' 
proposal abo prondts for appropnatt prottcll\ t ordtrs to ufrttuard clu.stfied tnformauon 
dlJ<lol<d to ddtndant> H R 4136 ,. •tron~ly support<d by th• Ju>toct D•partm<nt J 
IOJ Su nott l 1 ••r-~ 
Th< Hu«hu-Ryan Am<ndm<n ll U SC t 14Zllal 11916), r<quoro that Pr..,dtntal 
p mad< with ttg cov• th• ClA, and that notK< 
ti tMse findings be provtdtd .. lo tht appropnatt commllltts of the Congru.s, 1nclud1n1 the 
Commllltt on foreign Rtlat1ons of the: Unlltd Statu Scnatt and the Committee: on Fon1gn 
A.ffurs of the United tal.n HouK of Reprntntatl\CS " Id CurrtntJy such reporu art also f (J __ 
madt to lht 1n1c:lhllenct comm1t1ees of both hou~s. tht Stnalt and HouSit appropna11on' ~
tomm1tlt'es , and tht Sc:natt Armed Str\·Ku Comm1tltt. undtr arran~menu btl\lrttn thr CIA 
&ftd tht!iit comm1tttts 
IOS S 1114. ••P•• no1< l5 . and S ll16. ••P•• no1< IOI , p101>0>t to 1tptal th• ltu~hn· R)an 
\mtndmtnl and rt·pla1C" 11 "'11h a rC'<~uirt·mC'nl 1h~t1 unh lht> ltou'4:' ~nrl ~l'nall' 1n1tllirf'n<t 
(omm1llef'> bt nollfitd of vro1,,.,~ tO\C'rl 01xr.u1on' ~ lJ ~ ho14t\l·r , -.ould r("QUUf' thal 
fnn•'"" rtCtl\t' prior m.lhCC' of all court o,wrallonc. \ 1114~ 'Mprn nott 1'. ~4 10\t 1!'1 . IH 
lh1' 1on1r.11o.u "'-llh tht· rl't4u1rrmcn1 ol tht• Hu~hr ... J.ho.1 n \ mrn1ln1t:nt IO rq1orl •II ,u,h u1~r .. 
h•1t1 m ·a 11md' (a,h1on" to a1111roprt•U<' Hou-.<> anrl ~tna1.- c umm1llt'f'\ J! l ~ ( t l-'l11a1 
11•;01 1184 "'oulrl also cod1h rt>quire!Tk'nt' lh•t lht 1n1tlluc.-rw;t .. )tf'nc. lh (urna .. h an) 
u1(ormat1on rtqutsttd of thtm by tht 1nttlhtttnct commllkt,, and rtport 10 thot comrnllltts 
a.n(ormauon relaung to illegal or improper inttlhgc:nu act1v1uc:s Id 4 141Ca) 
Tbt pnor nouu prov1st0n o( S 1184 might undul) 1eoparduc: the saftly and sttunl) o( some: 
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information it nee<! ~ without unduly jeopardizing intelligence Proj 
While we pur~1. legislative solutions to these problems, the pr<>ctii 
of self-regu lation in the Executive anch must continue. Many oftJie 
regulatJons are pu 1c y ava1 a e 106 and as they gain wider review 
will all benefit from the analysis and critical comment of others. •01 ~ 
need for governmental self-regulation, however, will increase as fllod.' 
ern technology grows ever more sophisticated The state of the art la 
already so advanced as lo bear little relation to traditional fou~ 
amendment analysis, and will continue to outstrip the development a( 
decisional la~ for the forese~able future .. Although th~~ technolog~ 
advances will benefit national security by prov1d1ng increased 
efficiency of intelligence gathering, they will also increase the respo11- . 
sibility for fashioning proper safeguards in intelligence law. The in. ' 
lerpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, executive orders, 
and procedures affecting intelligence gathering will evolve in resporue • 
lo changing perceptions and new experiences. While we must guard 
against the adoption of an overly pliant construction of our self. 
imposed rules, I am confident that, in the light of experience, we CIQ 
continue to devise new standards which do not compromise our 
essential liberties and which support a strong intelligence comrnuniti 
equal to its critical mission . 
covtr1 oper•Hons which r~uirc tht utmost ~crtcy Whtn lht Hughts·Ryan Amtndrntnt .,. 
ongonally •nact<d, Congrus •P<<olically r<J<ctro th• languag• of •h• S.nat• boll, which clwiJ 
rrquirtd prior rtport1ng of covut Optrat1ons Comport Conftrcnct Report on foreign AuutaDClf 
Act of 1974, HR R•p No 16t0, 9Jrd Cong , 1d S.s. 11 , 41·43 , r<Pn•lcd •• 119141 US codi 
Cong & Ad N•ws 61J4 , 61U-4S , u1th S R•p No t199, 9Jrd Cong , 1d S.ss 4J, llQ.tl, 
rtfm•~d •• I 1914) US Cod• Cong & Ad N•ws 6614, 6707 Th• languagt adopted by Co 
rrqu1res only timely reporting of covert optrations Expuitnct under the Amtndmfflt has Pl"O¥el 
the wisdom o( chat duis10n Althou@:h prior nouct 1s, as a Jttncral rule , compatible Wllh n1tional 
internts, lhert are occu1ons when.· prior notice would JtOpard1u the safety of 1nd1viduMi 
involved 1n the ac11v1t)• or 1m1>a1r the tffecllvenu.s of an &CCl\'lly that reasonabit: propl< wo.W 
clearly support Jn such case~ . tlmtly notice: comporls 14 llh the constuuuonal role of the Pru.•dr• 
to U«ute the bws and of Congress to inform llstlf in order 10 legulate Pnor notict is • 
tsstnl1al 10 the leg1slallvt or oversigh1 proces~ . and substqufnt l1mtly notice may be crllical to 
successful uecullon of a covert operation 
106 Su nOCf' 14 Jupra 
107 Tht ent1rr corpus of undus1fird rule\ , reKula11ons, and statutes that 1s tmfr11:m« u t 
sub~tarll1\' f firld of mtflllJe:t"n<c law nC"td \ 10 Ix- carrfulh rrv1f'\\ed L".., 1hr acaclt m1r communtt) 
'iuch uam1na11on anti t"\'ct.luallon 1 ~ cr111,al lu th(" <onllnut'd n olution or mtdll~,·mr 1,.,. 
" 
